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CHAPTER 1 THE SPEAKERS BUREAU AND ITS RHETORICAL CHALLENGE 
 
Like any group of people whose identity includes some hidden element the dominant 
culture would consider “abnormal,” such as substance abuse or a history of incarceration, people 
with an undisclosed mental disability have a choice to make.  Do we disclose our difference and 
face the potential of being stigmatized, a condition that can lead to discrimination, disrespect, 
and social exclusion? Or, do we keep the stigma, the differentiating mark, hidden, thereby 
treating an aspect of who we are as a reason for shame?  In his foundational study, Stigma: Notes 
on the Management of Spoiled Identity, sociologist Erving Goffman calls this the decision of 
whether or not to move from being only “discreditable” to being “discredited” in the eyes of 
one’s community (4). In more recent scholarship on stigma, Lerita Coleman Brown observes that 
“stigma represents a kind of death—a social death. Non-stigmatized people, through avoidance 
and social rejection, often treat stigmatized people as if they were invisible, nonexistent, or dead” 
(156). While it would seem unlikely that anyone would willingly choose such fates, there are 
people who risk being discredited or suffering a social death. These people form groups that 
speak publicly about the characteristic that marks them. They believe their openness will lessen 
or even eliminate the stigma they and their compatriots bear. 
In this dissertation, I describe and analyze the rhetoric of one such organization—a local, 
grassroots group of mentally disabled individuals known as the County Health Organization 
Speakers Bureau. I do so to explore how members of this group, fully aware of the negative 
perceptions their audiences may have about them as people and as speakers, approach the task of 
persuading these audiences to alter these perceptions. I define rhetoric as the purposeful use of 
language to persuade an audience to think differently about a given reality. My study assumes we 
can learn something about both stigma and rhetoric by analyzing the spoken presentations, 
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rhetorical motivations, and rhetorical strategies of people who put themselves up in front of 
strangers to persuade them to understand, and therefore accept, the stigmatized “other.” It 
examines how these speaking experiences intersect with and are influenced by the larger cultural 
debates that currently structure rhetorics of mental disability. And it asks what these experiences 
might have to teach us about the rhetorical agency of a group of traditionally marginalized 
people. In this chapter, I introduce the Speakers Bureau, review the scholarly discussion 
regarding the way psychiatric diagnoses challenge the agency of mentally disabled rhetors, and 
present my study methodology.  
 Members of the Speakers Bureau have chosen to walk a path based on self-disclosure for 
over a decade. They regularly make presentations about their experience with mental disability to 
local high school and college psychology classes. Each presentation constitutes a fresh disclosure 
on the part of the speaker, who reveals himself as mentally disabled to a room full of strangers. 
Per its mission statement, the Speakers Bureau seeks to “put a face on mental illness, 
developmental disabilities, and substance abuse to overcome stigma and discrimination by 
sharing successful stories of hope and recovery.” 
 As indicated in its mission statement, the Bureau uses the term “mental illness” to refer to 
the psychiatrically diagnosed mental disorders of its members, disorders such as schizophrenia, 
depression, bipolar mood disorder, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. “Mental illness” is a 
highly controversial term, however, one rejected within the field of disability and Mad studies 
because it medicalizes conditions that members of these two communities view as “a way of 
being or processing that psychiatrists do not see as ‘normal’” (Burstow 83) (emphasis added). 
Following the lead of rhetorician and disability studies scholar, Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson, I use 
the term “mental disability” throughout this piece to refer to people with psychiatric diagnoses.  
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Lewiecki-Wilson argues for this nomenclature because it accounts for both the disability studies 
argument that disability is a social construction and the existence of real impairments 
experienced by people with psychiatrically-diagnosed conditions and developmental disabilities 
(164). Members of the Speakers Bureau, however, all refer to their conditions as “mental 
illnesses,” so I honor that terminology in quotations attributed to them. 
Speakers Bureau History 
 The Speakers Bureau began its work in the late 1990s. Its founder, Phil, decided in the 
spring of 1998 that he wanted to become a mental health advocate. As someone with a mental 
disability, he felt great compassion for others in similar situations. He wanted to help them, but 
at first was not sure how. At the time, he participated in the county’s Community Mental Health 
(CMH) department as a member of its Consumer Advisory Council. [Since then, CMH has been 
renamed Community Support and Treatment Services (CSTS).] According to Phil, members of 
the Consumer Advisory Council were and still are unsure of the use of the term “consumer” as a 
descriptor, feeling that it was not quite accurate. “Consumer” is one of the terms used to 
designate a mentally disabled person. It reflects the person’s use of supportive medical and social 
services and was popularized in the U.S. in the 1980s as a way to overcome the stigma 
associated with calling people “mental patients.” An Australian advocacy and support 
organization run entirely by consumers, “Our Consumers Place,” explains that although the term 
can be confusing, and even though many of the organization’s own members disagree with it, 
they use it because “[I]t’s the best term we have at the moment” (3-4)! For a while, what used to 
be known as the Consumer Advisory Council called itself the Community Support and 
Treatment Services Advisory Council or CSTSAC. In 2008, a larger County health organization 
took over the Speakers Bureau and renamed it the County Speakers Bureau. 
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 At a meeting in the late 1990s, the Consumer Advisory Council members were 
brainstorming ideas for projects. Phil suggested educational outreach. The group agreed with this 
idea and asked Phil to develop and act as head of a Speakers Bureau. They wanted to do outreach 
within the faith community—to churches, synagogues, and mosques—and to local high schools. 
Phil started out by cold calling the leaders of ten faith organizations and saying, “We are the 
Speakers Bureau. Would you be interested in having us come speak?” At first, one pastor and the 
head of the local Islamic Center expressed interest, but after some time both withdrew their 
invitations. In the end, members of the Bureau only spoke at two churches. In 2008, the present 
head of the Speakers Bureau, Gloria, took over Phil’s job and expressed interest in trying again 
to reach out to churches. She, too, did not meet with success.  
 Phil had much better luck connecting with local high schools. He would call each 
school’s receptionist and ask if the school had psychology classes and health classes. The 
receptionists put him in touch with the teachers of these classes, and Phil would say “Hi. My 
name is Phil. I’m with an outreach program to teach students about mental illness.” Despite one 
instructor initially mistaking him for a solicitor, Phil notes that almost every instructor he spoke 
with wanted members of the Speakers Bureau to present to their classes. What started out as a 
few presentations per school year eventually grew to the present rate of approximately 30 
Speakers Bureau class presentations per year. In addition to high schools, presentations at two 
local universities and the local community college were added to the schedule. The presentations 
consist of the story of each individual member’s experience with mental disability.  
 Asked to explain the purpose of the Speakers Bureau in his own words, Phil says “to 
bring knowledge of mental illness to students, to put a face on mental illness by showing 
students that people with mental illnesses can do things, like speak, and many other things.”  
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On a personal note, he adds:  
I want to help [the students]. That’s a huge goal—to inform people about mental 
illness, to help them nip mental illness in the bud if it is in their lives. There is the 
statistic that one in four people will have some sort of mental illness diagnosis in 
their lifetime. So, several students in any class will have some sort of diagnosis. I 
think the accurate statistic is that from the early teens to 24-25 is the time period 
when mental illness first comes about. So, I want to help them. And I tell students 
often that I want them to be able to help their friends and family members. It is so 
important for us to do that. My hope is that they will recognize symptoms, see 
there’s something wrong, and immediately get help. I sometimes wonder about 
when my mental illness cropped up. When I was in high school, there were no 
psychology classes.  
Asked about instructor feedback about the presentations, he notes that all the high school 
teachers and some of the college ones want the Bureau members back for the following semester 
and year. He also recalls one instructor telling him that she thought her students would remember 
the presentations long after they had forgotten the things they had learned in her class. Other 
instructors have told Phil that a few days after hearing the presentations, some students have 
opened up to them about mental health difficulties in their own lives. 
 The primary change the Speakers Bureau has experienced over the years is the coming 
and going of various speakers. Currently there are eight standing members. Over time, some 
speakers have left, finding themselves too busy with other work in the mental health field. Some 
have left due to the demands of work as “peer support specialists,” mentally disabled people who 
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provide support services to other mentally disabled people in the community. Others express 
limits, such as one speaker who enjoys the work but notes that he can only speak twice a month.  
 When the speaking sessions began, the only two speakers were Phil and a well-known, 
local mental health activist.  After a while, however, the Consumer Advisory Council expressed 
its dissatisfaction with having the activist speak, as she did not have a mental disability herself. It 
was decided that only people with mental disabilities, substance abuse issues, or co-occurring 
disorders (mental disability diagnoses combined with substance abuse problems) would do 
presentations. Worried that they might not find enough speakers, the group also agreed that 
professionals, such as doctors and nurses, could participate. (It is not clear why the group did not 
see this decision as a direct contradiction of its desire to limit speaker status to those who had 
mental disabilities.) Currently, though, the group does not include any mental health 
professionals. Through 2007, the Bureau used word-of-mouth to recruit new members. 
 In 2008, the organization began interviewing potential speakers. As the head of the 
Bureau, Gloria had, and still has, the responsibility for finding and vetting newcomers. She meets 
potential speakers through her county job as a peer support specialist. People also refer potential 
speakers to her. She interviews each referred person to see if they match the needs of the 
organization. Asked what made someone a “good speaker,” Phil replied that he or she has to be a 
good speaker, someone with the ability to speak, he or she has to have “an interesting story to 
tell,” and he or she has to be someone truly concerned about mentally disabled people, someone 
with a sincere desire to help them. I describe Gloria’s vetting process in Chapter Five. 
 Besides finding speakers, finding transportation has been another key issue for the group. 
In the early years, the above-mentioned local activist provided a great service by driving 
members who did not have cars to speaking engagements. Phil used to do some driving but now 
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does not drive because the side effects of one of his medications make this impossible. For a 
while, he had a friend who could drive him to presentations. He feels grateful that currently, 
several Speakers Bureau members have cars and can give him a ride on days when they co-
present with him. The presentations often involve two people, which can be useful if each has a 
different diagnosis. In this way, students get a look at more than one disability. But when one 
presenter “flies solo,” this can also be a useful way for the speaker to provide the student 
audience with a much greater level of detail about his or her experiences. 
 Due to the chronic nature of mental disability, the other important issue for the group has 
been the wellness of its members. At any given time, a member may fall ill and find himself 
unable to do a scheduled presentation. Although this is true, the current rate of about 30 
presentations a year suggests that the level of wellness in the group has been high. Phil did 
mention one year when the number fell below 30—the year he was hospitalized and could not do 
the necessary legwork to set up speaking engagements at the schools. He does not think that 
anyone else in the group took up the work. Gloria, also, has experienced periods of ill health, 
which affects the recruitment of new speakers. As long as these two group leaders remain 
healthy, however, the organization functions smoothly. 
 By studying members’ individual classroom presentations, interviewing them about their 
experiences as rhetors, and having them analyze their own speeches to identify rhetorical goals, I 
answer the following questions: If we agree with Goffman that being stigmatized requires a 
person to “manage” his or her own “spoiled” identity in interactions with the people Goffman 
calls “normals,” how does one group of mentally disabled people—well aware of the negative 
perceptions audiences may have about their capacities as individuals and as rhetors—narrate 
their experiences with mental disability with the goal of “unspoiling” or destigmatizing their 
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identities? And what might a primarily auto-ethnographic inquiry into their experiences in these 
rhetorical situations teach us about the potential rhetorical agency of mentally disabled 
individuals who act as advocates for the larger group?  
Background 
 Each member of the Speakers Bureau centers his advocacy on the act of publicly 
revealing his “mark” or stigma. During these acts of disclosure, he manages how he talks about 
his experience with mental disability, with the goal of changing the way audiences perceive 
people of “his kind.” He uses rhetoric to try to remove the stigma that adheres to the reality of his 
psychiatric diagnosis. Goffman defines “social identity” as the category into which the public 
expects a given person to fall and the characteristics associated with that category. He explains 
that a person possesses a stigma when her virtual social identity—the standard or “normal” 
attributes expected of her—comes into conflict with her actual social identity, which includes an 
attribute that marks her as undesirable and less than fully human (5). Goffman’s list of 
stigmatized categories of people includes physically disabled people and a group he calls “ex 
mental patients.” Stigmatized people, he notes, bear the constant burden of a desire for 
acceptance by the non-stigmatized population: “Those who have dealings with [the stigmatized 
person] fail to accord him the respect and regard which the uncontaminated aspects of his social 
identity have led them to anticipate extending, and have led him to anticipate receiving” (8-9). In 
rhetoric designed to win from audiences the respect and regard Goffman speaks of, Speakers 
Bureau members deliberately share details of their mental disabilities, the “contaminated” aspect 
of their identities. These disclosures may seem counter-intuitive, as they could heighten audience 
members’ fear or repugnance of the speakers. But, as this dissertation will show, they are the 
group’s key stigma-fighting technique. 
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The uneasiness and interpersonal tension caused by a stigmatized characteristic require 
the person who has one to “manage” her identity, as Goffman puts it, by using a variety of tactics 
designed either to put “normals” at ease regarding her adjustment to her situation or to make the 
argument that the stigmatized group she belongs to is fully human and does not deserve 
discrimination. Members of the Speakers Bureau do the latter. By “management of identity” 
Goffman refers to measures taken to adjust the face one presents to the world. While many of the 
management strategies he mentions can be considered rhetorical in that they involve spoken 
attempts to intervene in awkward social interactions—joking self-deprecatingly about one’s 
stigma before others have a chance to comment on it, for example—one relates to the classic 
rhetorical situation of presenting a speech to an audience in order to persuade them towards 
action or a change in perception.  
 Goffman notes that stigmatized people have groups or individual “agents” that represent 
them as advocates, trying to influence public opinion through the media and public policy 
through legislation. These agents sometimes work in the classic rhetorical capacity:  
  Another of their usual tasks is to appear as ‘speakers’ before various audiences of  
  normals and of the stigmatized; they present the case for the stigmatized and,  
  when they themselves are natives of the group, provide a living model of fully- 
  normal achievement, being heroes of adjustment who are subject to public awards 
  for proving that an individual of this kind can be a good person. (24-25)  
By suggesting that “normals” need proof that their fellow human beings are “good,” Goffman 
here, as elsewhere in his text, pokes gentle fun at them for stigmatizing their brethren. Members 
of the Speakers Bureau do present themselves as “living models of fully-normal achievement” 
and “heroes of adjustment” in the sense that they present stories of mental disability that follow a 
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similar arc: initial onset of the mental disability, recognition that something is wrong even if this 
recognition takes a long time to achieve, attempts to get help, provision of help, and eventual 
recovery and achievement, which runs the gamut from simple day-to-day functioning, to 
employment, to the pursuit of higher education, to taking on the role of counselor and service 
provider for fellow mentally disabled people. As the Bureau’s mission statement requires, the 
stories all strike a note of hope for people with psychiatric diagnoses. 
 Goffman’s statement that speakers win awards for proving that the stigmatized people 
can be considered “good” suggests that spoken rhetoric can reverse the effects of stigma and lift 
the stigmatized up to the same social level as the “normal” who previously considered them 
“bad.” What is presupposed here, however, is an audience that will take what stigmatized 
speakers have to say seriously. Catherine Prendergast argues that such an audience does not exist 
for mentally disabled people. According to Prendergast, audiences dismiss the rhetoric of the 
mentally disabled person automatically because her diagnosis marks her as irrational and 
therefore not capable of producing meaningful discourse. Prendergast assesses the rhetorical 
output of a friend with schizophrenia in the following way: “[G]iven the present configuration of 
discourses on mental illness, the writing of schizophrenics can only be seen as arhetorical, the 
test, the record of symptoms, Exhibit A . . . some personal expression that has no bearing outside 
itself, no transactional worth. That the mentally ill are devoid of rhetoric would seem to me to be 
and obvious point. If people think you’re crazy, they don’t listen to you” (“On the Rhetorics” 
57). The key phrase in Prendergast’s assessment of the rhetoric of mentally disabled people is 
that people “don’t listen” to those who are deemed “crazy.”  Rhetorical agency, that force that 
achieves persuasion in any rhetorical situation, depends not just on the skill of the person who 
speaks but on the willingness of an audience to truly listen. If Prendergast is right, Speakers 
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Bureau members encounter a rhetorical impasse before they even enter the classroom. The 
students know the people visiting are “crazy” and thus may be primed to disregard their 
presentations, no matter what persuasive methods these include. Speakers in this situation would 
lack rhetorical agency. 
Karlyn Campbell describes rhetorical agency, in its most basic form, as “the capacity to 
act, that is, to have the competence to speak or write in a way that will be recognized or heeded 
by others in one’s community.”  She adds that “such competency permits entry into ongoing 
cultural conversations and is the sine qua non of public participation, much less resistance as a 
counter-public” (3). But Campbell does not consider rhetorical agency something that the rhetor 
possesses on his own.  Instead, she describes the writer or speaker as a “point of articulation” 
through which historical and cultural forces, as well as the inventive powers of the writer or 
speaker, act (5). One of cultural forces that contributes to rhetorical agency in a speaking 
situation, then, is the force exerted by the complex elements that make up any given audience, 
including the history and viewpoints its members bring to the rhetorical situation. But this 
audience might be one that, at least initially, denies the credibility of the stigmatized person, as 
Prendergast suggests. The stigmatized speaker, the Speakers Bureau member, has extra work to 
do, rhetorically, because they bear a stain that discredits them in the eyes of the audience.  
 In later work, Prendergast indicates her understanding that some mentally disabled 
people, like members of any stigmatized group, do take steps to develop and raise a rhetoric to 
combat the stigma that circulates in the communities where they live and amongst the institutions 
with which they interact. They expect their words to have what she refers to as “transactional 
worth” (“On the Rhetorics” 57). As examples of this rhetoric, she mentions New York City 
Voices and Schizophrenia Digest, magazines containing articles written by people Prendergast 
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describes as “unexceptional schizophrenics,” people who fit neither the mass killer nor the Nobel 
prize-winning stereotypes of people with schizophrenia (“Paying Attention?” 243). The editor of 
the initial version of New York City Voices celebrates the fact that the writers of the magazine’s 
personal narratives include their own names as bylines and often allow the inclusion of the 
writer’s photograph. He calls this forthrightness “a bold but necessary move” because disclosure 
must happen in order to begin the fight against stigma (Prendergast, “Paying Attention” 242). 
Members of the Speakers Bureau are even bolder with their disclosures, in that they appear in 
person to audiences to reveal what “craziness” can look and sound like. Also “unexceptional,” in 
that they don’t match either the stereotypes of violent criminals at one end of the spectrum or the 
brilliant artists at the other, they use their presence and speeches to promote an alternative 
perception of mental disability. A question remains, however: What exactly can speakers do to 
encourage student audiences to “heed,” i.e. to take the anti-stigma message they are hearing 
seriously? 
 Discussing the steps some mentally disabled writers take to increase the agency of their 
work, Katie Rose Guest Pryal describes the successful use of rhetorical resources in her 
discussion of “mood memoirs,” book-length narratives of mental disability experience written by 
people with disabilities such as depression and bipolar mood disorder. She concludes that the 
narrators she discusses work carefully to construct ethos for themselves by using four rhetorical 
techniques: the presentation of an apologia that offers the desire to help fellow mentally disabled 
people as the reason for focusing attention on one’s pain; description of a moment of awakening 
to the reality of having a disability and seeking treatment; criticism of doctors, to exert authority 
over one’s own health; and “laying claim” by making reference to other, often famous people 
with mental disabilities, with the goal of making the disability seem less exotic (499). By using 
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these techniques, Pryal explains, the narrators bolster their credibility and authority in the eyes of 
their readers.  
 The commentary of Prendergast, Campbell, and Pryal raises issues pertinent to the 
rhetorical endeavors of the Speakers Bureau. Considering their discussion of agency, the biggest 
obstacle the mentally disabled rhetor faces is absent ethos, or at least severely weakened ethos as 
compared to that of a rhetor who the audience does not deem “irrational” before he even opens 
his mouth to speak.  Given this weakened ethos, Bureau members must carefully craft 
presentations that generate the credibility necessary to persuade audiences of two things—that 
the speaker has the competence necessary to represent his reality of living with mental disability 
and, based on the nature of that representation, that the speaker is, indeed, fully human.  In order 
to understand how members of the Speakers Bureau attempt to influence the rhetorical agency of 
their own public presentations—the means they employ to get audiences to “recognize and heed” 
their two concurrent messages--I employ the following methods.    
Methods 
To keep the study manageable in size, I chose not to attempt empirical measurement of 
the effect of our speeches on individual student audience members in the multiple classrooms the 
study participants visited. Instead, I focused on how rhetors up against a wall of stigma try to 
find ways through and around that wall, based on our assessments of how stigma operates in our 
culture. Because I wanted to study the rhetoric of people with “mental illnesses,” I only chose 
study participants from the Speakers Bureau’s total membership who have a standing diagnosis 
of “mental illness” rather than developmental disability or substance abuse. By “rhetoric” I refer 
to the purposeful use of language to persuade an audience to think differently about a given 
reality. My psychiatric diagnosis, bipolar mood disorder, allowed me to join the group’s stigma 
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fighting work as a participant-observer. I did so to contribute to the collective effort and to 
develop research insights I believed could be gained only by undertaking the same rhetorical 
work as other study participants. Because I share the experience of mental disability with my 
fellow group members, I chose auto-ethnography as my study methodology. Auto-ethnography 
allows me to provide one particularly in-depth perspective to add to the others gathered in the 
attempt to answer my overriding research question—In what ways do people who are highly 
aware of themselves as stigmatized approach the task of using persuasive speech to fight that 
stigma?  
There is a strong history and lineage of auto-ethnographic research in disability studies 
because the question of the personal offers the disabled researcher a particularly rich set of 
resources to draw upon in answering her research questions.  Thomas Couser contrasts disability 
autobiography and disability autoethnography by explaining that the latter involves “the 
depiction of individuals as involved in a community of people with disabilities and/or a 
distinctive disability-based culture.” He adds that autoethnography “[explores] the positive ways 
in which identity and life narrative are shaped by disability, the ways in which disability may 
create culture.” Couser rejoices that: 
[a]lready there are a number of narratives whose authors address their 
membership in a larger community or culture of disability—The Body Silent 
(1987) by Robert Murphy, and anthropologist who had a spinal tumor that slowly 
paralyzed and finally killed him; Lessons in Laughter: The Autobiography of a 
Deaf Actor (1989), by the deaf mime, Bernard Bragg; Missing Pieces: A 
Chronicle of Living with a Disability (1982), by Irving Zola, a sociologist and 
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polio survivor; and Anne Finger’s Past Due: A Story of Disability, Pregnancy and 
Birth (1990). (“Empire of the Normal” 308) 
He calls these auto-ethnographies “first-person plural accounts of disability because they all 
involve the authors’ growing consciousness of themselves as disabled (“Empire of the Normal” 
309). My dissertation, too, addresses the extent to which study participants, myself included, 
identify with their disabilities. 
Couser notes that “[a]uto-ethnography is a slippery, ambiguous, but useful, and indeed 
indispensable term” as more disability-focused autoethnographies have been published 
(“Disability and Autoethnography” 126). He clarifies that term by citing Deborah Reed-
Danahay’s contention that: 
[a]uto-ethnography stands at the intersection of three genres of writing which are 
increasingly visible: (1) “native anthropology,” in which people who were 
formerly the subjects of ethnography become the authors of studies of their own 
group. . .; (2) “ethnic autobiography,” personal narratives written by members of 
ethnic minority groups; (3) “autobiographical ethnography,” in which 
anthropologists interject personal experience into ethnographic writing. (qtd. in 
“Disability and Ethnography” Couser 127)   
I argue that my description and analysis of the rhetorical production, motivations, and felt 
experience of this study’s participants, myself included, meets the description of 
autoethnography that Couser presents in his discussion of the connection between this research 
method and disability: “Like other postcolonial subjects, disabled people are beginning to 
produce texts that are autoethnography in the senses of ethnographic autobiography and native 
anthropology—that is, texts that explore the creation of identity within particular subcultures and 
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texts that contest the way the author’s community is characterized from the outside” (“Disability 
and Ethnography” 128). I chose to pursue auto-ethnography because questions of identity stand 
at the center of auto-ethnographic research and questions about the discursive presentation of 
identity stand at the center of my study of the Speakers Bureau’s stigma fighting efforts. (Smith 
17). As a method in disability rhetoric, autoethnography allows me to gain deep insight into the 
rhetorical labors of Speakers Bureau members by examining these labors through the lens of 
personal experience.  
My study seeks to understand the rhetorical strategies mentally disabled people employ in 
their attempt to “manage their spoiled identities” before audiences in ways that circumvent the 
obstacles they face as rhetors operating under the constraints of stigma. The particulars of that 
identity management, as I explain in Chapter Two, depend on which of two competing models of 
mental disability a Speakers Bureau member subscribes to—the medical model or the 
consumer/survivor/ex-patient (c/s/x) model. 
By investigating both the classroom presentations and the thinking of Bureau members, I 
contribute to rhetorical studies a view from inside a relatively high stakes endeavor. Scenes of 
mental illness disclosure are fraught with both possibility and potential danger. My study 
examines how speakers work to contribute to the fight against stigma through their classroom 
presentations, but I have also been alert for any negative repercussions of these efforts, both to 
individual speakers and to the stigma-fighting effort overall.  
My autoethnography involved the following research activities: As noted, I joined the 
Bureau as a participant-observer.  To capture what it means to try to persuade others to respect 
one’s identity while highly aware that that identity is “spoiled,” by the presence of a psychiatric 
diagnosis, I took ethnographic field notes about my speaking experiences and my interactions 
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with Bureau members. To this auto-ethnographic data I added tape-recordings of the classroom 
presentations of five other speakers, which I used to rhetorically analyze how they managed their 
identities before audiences. I also tape-recorded interviews with each speaker, interviews whose 
open-ended questions were designed to help me understand how speakers experienced the act of 
narrating their stories of mental disability (See Appendix A).   To investigate the rhetorical 
motivations of the speakers in the study, I asked each participant to analyze a transcript of their 
taped classroom presentation, following these directions: 
Please read over the transcript carefully and either circle or highlight any words,  
 phrases, sentences, or paragraphs that seem significant to you for any reason.   
 Number the circled or highlighted word, phrase, etc. On a separate sheet of paper,  
 write down that number. Then please answer the following questions for each  
 passage/sentence/etc. that you marked as significant. If the answer to any of the  
 questions is “I don’t know,” feel free to skip that question:  Why did you say this? 
 What effect were you aiming for? What did you feel like when you said this? 
 How do you think the audience responded when you said this?  
I used the data gathered from this exercise to develop an understanding of strategies individual 
speakers used to achieve their goal of fighting stigma. 
 The five speakers I recruited are people who present at schools regularly. I chose them 
for the study because Phil introduced them to me as potential participants, and they each agreed 
to take part when contacted by phone. They represent a cross-section of psychiatric diagnoses:  
schizo-affective disorder, paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar mood disorder, Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, and bipolar mood disorder/substance abuse.  
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Per IRB requirements, all participants received and signed consent forms that indicated 
they were comfortable with the potential research participation risks noted on the forms. The 
risks were outlined as follows: 
By taking part in this study, you may experience the following risks:  
o Emotional--(e.g., feelings of sadness or anxiety related to discussing experiences 
with mental illness.) This risk is likely, although it may be lessened by the fact 
that participants are accustomed to talking about their illnesses in public settings. 
Participants will also have the opportunity to skip any interview question they are 
not comfortable with or to stop answering a question part way through if doing so 
becomes uncomfortable in any way.) 
o Social—If the participant has not disclosed their illness in social settings outside 
of the community speaking sites, loss of confidentiality could lead to social 
stigma. This risk is less likely because the investigator will take every reasonable 
and appropriate protection to make sure risks related to invasion of privacy and 
breach of confidentiality are no greater than minimal.  
o Economic--(e.g., a loss of confidentiality could possibly effect employment 
status or the ability to procure employment.) This risk is less likely because the 
investigator will take every reasonable and appropriate protection to make sure 
risks related to invasion of privacy and breach of confidentiality are no greater 
than minimal.  
I have taken steps to maintain the confidentiality of each participant. These include the use of 
pseudonyms and the storage of all study materials (tapes, transcripts, notes) on a password-
protected computer stored in a locked file cabinet in my home.  
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During the study, the participants had enough psychiatric stability to be speaking to 
classrooms of high school students. Hearing the content of their presentations assured me that 
each person has a great deal of insight into the workings of their individual mental disabilities. 
Therefore, I trusted that they would inform me if they are not well enough to participate in an 
interview at any given time. While I could not be certain that the act of talking about one’s 
mental disability in the interviews would not trigger a negative emotional reaction in a 
participant, I entered the interviews with the idea that the benefit of participating in the 
research—the chance to contribute to an in-depth study of the workings of their own 
organization—outweighed the risks. In addition, I came to each interview with the understanding 
that I would not probe a participant regarding a specific question if they showed any signs of 
emotional or physical discomfort with or prior to that question. I also planned to end any 
interview if a participant began to show discomfort. I believed that my prior training as a mental 
health service provider would help me to recognize signs of such discomfort. Fortunately, all the 
interviews proceeded without complications. I cannot, of course, account for emotions they may 
have raised after the interviews ended, but no one contacted me to report a problem.  Gloria did 
mention to me one other study risk that concerned her—the risk that my research would reveal 
the Speakers Bureau’s work fighting stigma to be ineffective. 
Chapter Descriptions: 
In Chapter Two, I narrate my experiences as a first-time speaker with the Speakers 
Bureau. My description and analysis emphasize my reactions to the questions and emotions 
raised for me by the act of talking about my mental illness in a highly public way I was not used 
to.  The chapter also turns to outside sources to provide needed background on the larger mental 
disability-related debates touched on by my personal reactions to speaking and especially my 
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interactions with one speaker whose views about mental disability contrasted sharply with my 
own. I provide analysis of how a speaker’s adherence to one of two culturally competing models 
of mental disability influences the nature of that person’s rhetoric in the stigma-fighting 
endeavor. 
In Chapter Three, I focus on the rhetoric of two Speakers Bureau members, Phil, and 
Ruth. Like all my study participants, they offer their audiences what I call “deep disclosure,” the 
presentation of the sometimes-disturbing details of their disability-related experiences. Deep 
disclosure can make both speakers and their audience members vulnerable in distinct ways, 
which I cover in the chapter. Vulnerability in these rhetorical situations need not only be viewed 
as threatening, however. Rather, I argue, it has the potential to be highly productive, even 
conducive to rhetorical agency, when it encourages the speaker and audience member’s openness 
to each other’s influence. 
Chapter Four takes up a moment when the stigma that adheres to mental disability 
intersected with my work as a writing teacher. I examine an incident in my classroom to 
understand my inability to react productively to my students’ apparent stigmatization of bipolar 
mood disorder. After providing analysis of this pedagogical failure, I describe and analyze a 
lesson plan I developed to guide how I would proceed in the face of future instances of mental 
disability stigma in the classroom.  
In Chapter Five, I contrast the argument implied by the five group members who speak 
from within the medical model of mental disability with the argument implied by the group’s 
leader, who speaks from within the alternative consumer/survivor/ex-patient model. I explore the 
stigma-fighting implications of the two differing arguments. The former asks audiences to 
recognize that mentally disabled speakers are mostly “just like them” while the latter insists 
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audience members expand their concept of what kinds of identities constitute “us.” In the 
chapter, I also look ahead to the possibility of future research linked to my concern about the 
Bureau’s practice of vetting potential speakers.  
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CHAPTER 2 THE MODELS BEHIND SPEAKERS’ RHETORICAL CHOICES 
As Tony Adams, Stacy Jones, and Carolyn Ellis explain in their description of auto-
ethnography, theory plays a symbiotic role in an auto-ethnographic text such as this one: 
“Theory asks about and explains the nuances of an experience and the happenings of a culture; 
story is the mechanism that illustrates and embodies these nuances and happenings. Conceived in 
this way, theory is not an add-on to story. Instead, theory is a way to understand—think with and 
through, ask questions about, and act on—the experiences and happenings in our stories” (89-
90). In this chapter, I autoethnographically examine the act of publicly sharing one’s story of 
mental disability, using the lens of my experiences and observations as a new member of the 
Speakers Bureau. In telling my/our story, I combine my commentary with that of other scholars 
to understand what drives the rhetorical choices involved in representing experiences of mental 
disability in ways that hold true to their often-disturbing nature but still attempt to produce the 
social acceptance sought from audiences.  
This chapter takes up the ongoing cultural debate about how to think of, and speak of, 
mental disability. After describing two competing visions—the medical model that views mental 
disability as an illness and the alternative consumer/survivor/ex-patient model (c/s/x) that views 
it as simply an alternative way of being human—I explore how Speakers Bureau members’ 
choices of model influence the terminology we use when representing our identities in 
classrooms. Rhetorical choices regarding how to represent, or manage, one’s identity in speeches 
made to students matter because these choices affect what “face” of mental disability those 
students see. Although we speak as individuals, none of the speakers in my study ever said in a 
presentation, “Now, remember, this is just my experience.” Rather, each of us offered up our 
story of mental disability as the story of mental disability. Through our rhetoric of narrative 
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disclosure, each of us presented the argument: “What I am describing to you is what mental 
disability is.” Given that our arguments differ, the question of which conception of mental 
disability—medical illness or alternative way of being human—audiences are more likely to find 
persuasive remains open. By examining how stigmatized rhetors navigate terminology to 
persuade audiences to accept them as equal human beings, we can gain insight into the stigma-
fighting endeavor as a rhetorical endeavor.  
As will be noted, through much of this dissertation I refer to the purposes and thinking of 
members of the Speakers Bureau using the pronoun “we.” While the group of six study 
participants (myself included) whose rhetorical product and motivations I examined closely do 
not in any way form a monolith in terms of identity, I did notice enough similarities in our 
experiences as rhetors operating under the constraints of stigma to make me feel comfortable 
using that pronoun. In other ways, outside of rhetorical production, Speakers Bureau members 
differ significantly from each other. 
As indicated by the content of the speeches, by interviews with participants, and by 
participants’ self-analysis of transcripts of their presentations, Speakers Bureau members seek to 
secure freedom from stigma for ourselves and all mentally disabled people. We seek the respect 
that comes from finally being considered fully human (Goffman, 5). As noted in Chapter One, I 
use the term “mental disability” when referring to psychiatrically diagnosed mental disorders. I 
refer to “mental disability” instead of the more commonly used term, “mental illness,” which is 
disapproved within disability and Mad studies circles because it medicalizes conditions that 
scholars and activists in these circles believe should be more broadly considered states of 
“mental distress” (Reeve 99). In quotations of Speakers Bureau members, I have kept in their 
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references to “mental illness” to honor the way other members of the Speakers Bureau and I 
speak about ourselves.  
 The narratives each speaker shares in the classroom share a similar arc—from initial 
diagnosis to experiences receiving treatment, to eventual recovery, a condition of relative 
wellness achieved, most speakers argue, through the use of medication. Each narrative consists 
of disclosure—first the large-scale disclosure of mental disability, followed by a series of 
disclosures of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors many in the audiences may find unfamiliar and 
quite possibly disturbing.  Speakers Bureau members make these latter disclosures to establish 
our identities as people with mental illnesses and to give our audiences a glimpse into what it 
means to live with mental disability. 
 Asked if presenting at Speakers Bureau events has changed how she thinks about herself 
at all, the Bureau’s director, Gloria, answers in a way that emphasizes the link between mental 
disability and identity: “Yeah I would say so. I see myself as an educator, as a change-agent. . . 
there’s a big mass to be formed and I’m forming it. I’m not just sitting passively by and letting 
people form who I am. I’m forming for myself who I am, forming for myself how people think 
about me” (emphasis added). Speakers Bureau narratives are rhetoric we use to form for 
ourselves and our audiences who we are and, consequently, how we want to be perceived. They 
are constructions and presentations of identity. Disability theorist, Tobin Siebers, describes 
identities as “the theories that we use to fit into and travel through the social world” (287).  In 
other words, identities are tools we use to interact with others. In Goffman’s terms, Bureau 
members use narratives to rhetorically “manage” our identities in the presence of audiences we 
assume contain mostly “normal” and some mentally disabled members.  Gloria’s determination 
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not to let others form who she is illustrates the “management” aspect of the speakers’ 
representations of their identities to external audiences.  
 We take on this identity management, the aforementioned task of “putting a face on 
mental illness,” with a specific purpose. Intent on fighting our own stigmatization, our goal in 
making rhetorical choices about the narratives we present—choices regarding content, language, 
style, etc.—is to garner “recognition” from the audience for our identities as mentally disabled 
people. Patchen Markell describes recognition as a concept often discussed as a solution to the 
identity-based oppression of marginalized groups. Recognition, he notes, is traditionally defined 
as giving respect to a group of people based on their true identity, based on who they really are 
(88-89) (emphasis added). By telling our stories of experience with mental disability, each of the 
study’s participants paints a picture in words of who she really is, a picture focused on the role of 
mental disability her life. We offer these pictures hoping that audiences will see that who we 
really are does not match the stigmatizing images of “the mentally ill” that circulate in the 
culture. 
But for members of the Speakers Bureau, the question of identity, of who one really is, is 
not negotiated simply. This is the case because, for a mentally disabled person, the public 
representation of the self depends on what that person believes mental disability really is. My 
study revealed that five speakers, myself included, subscribe to one of two major models of 
mental disability, while Gloria subscribes to the other. Which model a speaker uses to explain his 
psychiatrically diagnosed condition—the traditional “medical model” or the alternative c/s/x 
model—makes a significant difference in how he speaks about himself to audiences. In the data I 
gathered, the depiction of who one really is depended partly on whether the mentally disabled 
rhetor believed mental disability is a brain-based illness that requires medical intervention (the 
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medical model) or, instead, just another way of being on a spectrum of ways of being human (the 
c/s/x model).  
In seeking to overcome the stigma the adheres to our psychiatric diagnoses, one of our 
primary jobs as rhetors is to bolster the damage done to our ethos by the labels we carry. When 
Jennell Johnson describes the damage done to the reputation of George McGovern’s vice-
presidential candidate, Terry Eagleton, after leaked reports of Eagleton’s treatment for 
depression, she asks what accommodations audiences can make for “the bad man speaking 
poorly” (476). She uses the term kakoethos to describe the spoiled ethos Eagleton experienced 
once the public began to see him as a mentally disabled candidate rather than simply a candidate 
(Johnson 462). My observations of the Speakers Bureau reveal the terminology and rhetorical 
poses some speakers resort to in order to overcome the kakoethos that naturally dogs us as 
rhetors before we even open our mouths in classrooms. We turn to these means because we are 
aware of the danger Stephanie Kerschbaum warns of in her discussion of public disclosures of 
disability. We know that our credibility with audiences can often start out as spoiled because, as 
Kerschbaum notes, disability disclosures are often met with automatic assumptions that the 
disabled person is incompetent (69). As noted earlier, the means we use to overcome these 
aspersions of incompetence often depend on which model of mental disability we identify with 
and use in explanations of our lives. 
The Medical Model and its Challengers 
My first point of Speakers Bureau contact involved a meeting with Gloria. After 
describing the group and some of its history, she interviewed me to see if I would be a good fit 
for the Bureau. I had not expected an interview, having assumed that simply having a mental 
disability was qualification enough. My interview consisted primarily of Gloria asking me to tell 
27 
 
 
 
my story briefly. I also answered questions such as “How do you define recovery?” At the time, I 
did not ask her what she or the group meant by “recovery.” Based on what I had been told by the 
two psychiatrists I have worked with over time, it has always been my understanding that people 
do not “recover” from mental illness. While remission, even very long periods of it, is possible 
with the right treatment, there is no such thing as “being cured” to the point where treatment—by 
which I mean the use of medications to right the chemical imbalance causing the illness—is no 
longer necessary.    
 The issue of medications turns out to be significant to my experience with the Speakers 
Bureau. The nature of my 29 years of mental illness has steeped me firmly in the medical model. 
According to this model, mental disorders are diseases of the brain and therefore require 
intervention through medication.  I came to my strong belief in this model in a few ways, the 
greatest of which is its success in keeping me basically well over the decades. When I was first 
diagnosed with bipolar mood disorder, my psychiatrist started me on a course of medications that 
“did the trick” as far as I was concerned. They kept me above suicidal for the year it took me to 
crawl out of the depression that followed a six-week period of mania.  
 My second major episode of illness also followed the same course, about six weeks of 
mania, followed by a year-long depression. Again, the prescribed medications did not lift me out 
of the depression. Instead, they seemed to keep me just above suicidal for the year it took for my 
mood to stabilize. Some people would look at my initial illness history and say that it does not 
seem that the medications were that helpful, or even helpful at all. But even through the haze of 
depression, I had faith that they were keeping me out of the worst possible and most dangerous 
place—suicidality. Although I have been lucky enough never to get very seriously ill again, in 
the years that followed there have been small “blips” of depression and one of the less than fully 
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manic condition known as “hypo-mania.” In each these cases, I believe, medication intervention 
definitely brought me back to full mental health.  
Disability theorist, Lennard Davis, makes a strong case against the medical model, which 
he calls “this framing of sorrow and sadness as pathology” (60). He presents scientifically-based 
arguments against the contention that the standard form of anti-depressant medications—SSRIs 
(selective serotonin uptake inhibitors)— work to alleviate the symptoms of what psychiatrists 
call depression. His argument indicates he would consider my report of successful medical 
treatment a legitimate but uninformed opinion that ignores the lack of true scientific support for 
the usefulness of medications:  
Involved in the “works for me” approach are the many people who take SSRIs 
and respond with their own narratives. These personal narratives, in print and 
online, are very compelling, although they cut both ways. Some people report 
life-saving effects and relief from personal suffering from taking SSRIs. Other 
people report devastating “side” effects, including suicidal impulses and the 
actual suicides of relatives or friends. (Davis 57) 
Three out of the six Speakers Bureau participants in my study present versions of the “works for 
me” argument regarding their own success with medications. Gloria, however, indicates to 
audiences that medications are not necessarily a cure-all, noting that even if they do eventually 
work, they may require patience from the person taking them.  
In her classroom presentation, her interview, and her speech transcript self-analysis, 
Gloria identifies herself as a member of the Recovery Movement. In the Recovery model of 
mental disability, the person with the disability is primarily in control of their treatment. As 
Frederick Frese III et. al. put it: “The locus of control thus becomes less external. Mental health 
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interventions are designed to be empowering, enabling the persons themselves to take 
responsibility for decisions about their lives” (1463). In contrast to this model, Frese et. al. 
present Munetz and Frese’s description of the medical model: 
.  .  .the evidence-based, medical model has been highly paternalistic, 
emphasizing illness, weakness, and limitations rather than the potential for 
growth. . . the evidence-based medical model has been perceived as stamping out 
hope by implying that biology is destiny and emphasizing an external locus of 
control. . . some consumer advocates view the physician as a powerful and 
oppressive figure who ‘at best is acting out of misguided beneficence’ and at 
worst fosters ‘helplessness and chronicity.’ (qtd. in Frese et. al. 1463-64) 
My personal experiences with psychiatry have not shown it to me in this light. But in saying this, 
I must acknowledge the moderate nature of my psychiatric condition. Not being severely 
disabled by my illness and having a doctor willing to work with me as a partner have both 
allowed me to be primarily in control of my treatment. I have never experienced what some other 
mentally ill people have—being forced to take medication and/or being committed to psychiatric 
hospitalization against my will.  
 The medical model, which does argue that chemical imbalances in the brain cause many 
mental disabilities and that some disabilities have a clear genetic component, began with the 
introduction of psychotropic medications in the 1950s. In the 1960s, the use of such medications 
increased, and they provided symptom relief for many people who had previously had no hope of 
such improvement. Stephen Hinshaw outlines the clinical significance of these results, the 
discovery of warranted genetic sources for several disabilities, and the ways in which 
neuroimaging has been used to illustrate significant physical differences in the brains of mentally 
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disabled people. He states: “Such vivid portrayals of the neurobiological underpinnings of 
serious psychopathology make it hard to believe that mental illness is either imaginary or the 
product of weak will” (Hinshaw 85). At the same time, he does argue that attributing mental 
disability solely to biology or genetics fails to acknowledge the effect of environmental factors 
on the brain, an organ known for its plasticity. He supports what he identifies as the 
developmental psychopathology model (DP), which includes the role of biology and genetics but 
also takes environmental influences, including experience, into consideration when describing 
the origin of mental disability (Hinshaw 86).  
Some powerful mental health advocacy groups, such as the National Alliance on Mental 
Illness (NAMI), have adopted the medical model in the hope that focusing on mental disability 
as a brain disorder will fight the societal tendency to blame mentally disabled people and their 
family members for their conditions (Hinshaw 85).Within this model, a person with a mental 
disability takes medication to manage symptoms—aberrant thoughts, emotions, and behaviors, 
ones which are found to be debilitating and which the people who experience them, and their 
psychiatrists, do not consider a part of “normal” existence.   
 The controversy over what constitutes “mental illness” continues, even as many people 
receive care based on the medical model. That controversy plays itself out in a much greater 
number of texts than can be covered in this exploration. I will limit this look to a brief 
description of three positions on mental disability: a critique of the medical model’s central text, 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the c/s/x model of mental 
disability, and a suggested “human rights approach” to mental disability that takes its cue from 
the larger field of disability studies. I examine the controversy because it directly influences 
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some of the rhetorical choices the participants in my study make about how to represent 
themselves to audiences. 
 In Making Us Crazy--DSM: The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental Disorders, 
Herb Kutchins and Stuart Kirk take on all incarnations of the DSM, including the most recent 
two which are supposed to have made significant improvements. The DSM is a guide of 
symptoms and disorders that psychiatrists use as a diagnostic aid. Kutchins and Kirk argue that 
the diagnostic criteria for mental disorders include too many states and behaviors that could just 
as easily be classified as normal or non-disordered. They claim that the DSM uses the rhetoric of 
science, specifically claims for scientific validity (that the diagnoses arrived at using the criteria 
are accurate) and reliability (that all clinicians would arrive at the same diagnoses using the 
criteria) to cloak its arbitrariness and its susceptibility to the influence of advocacy groups and 
other powerful entities.  
 I find their argument reasonable but limited in that the only examples they provide of 
potentially non-disordered but still diagnosed conditions are on the fringes of present day 
psychiatric assessment and do not include the major mental disabilities, such as depression, 
bipolar mood disorder, and schizophrenia, whose impairing effects I find hard to consider 
“normal” or non-disordered. They do give historical examples that greatly support their case, 
which include the diagnosis of homosexuality as a psychiatric condition and the inclusion in the 
DSM of a diagnosis for women called “masochistic personality disorder.” Both diagnoses were 
removed, the first after an outcry from gay activists and the second after protests from feminist 
groups. 
 Another challenge to the medical model comes from the c/s/x community, also known as 
the Mad Pride movement.  This group has its origins in the anti-psychiatry movement that started 
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in the 1960s with support from writers including psychiatrists, Thomas Szasz, and R.D. Laing. 
These anti-psychiatrists argue, in varied ways, that mental disability is a myth, not a pathology 
but, rather, “a way of coping in a mad world” (Lewis 120). The Mad Pride movement considers 
what psychiatrists refer to as mental illness “mental difference.” It argues against the medical 
model’s emphasis on considering mental disability an individual defect, the psychiatric 
establishment’s primacy in deciding what treatment the mentally distressed individual needs, and 
what the movement considers an artificial distinction between “normal” and “abnormal” mental 
states (Lewis 116-17).  
 The Mad Pride movement originated in the negative experience its founders had within 
the psychiatric system. Its initial focus was a fight against involuntary commitment statutes and 
the reality that mentally disabled people can be legally forced to take medications (Mulvaney 
594). Once highly radical in its challenge to the very definition of mental disability and the role 
of psychiatrists, Mad Pride has moderated its stance over time as its success with developing 
peer-run support services for people in mental distress (a term the movement prefers to the term 
“mentally ill”) has won it a seat at the mental health policy table. In the interests of coalition 
building, the movement moved away from Szasz’s black and white view of psychiatry towards 
the inclusion of “consumers,” people who still have issues with psychiatry but also choose to 
receive services from the psychiatric system (Lewis 121). As David Oaks, one of the leaders of 
the movement puts it: “We respect the right of people to choose the option of prescribed 
psychiatric drugs. Many of us have made this personal choice.  .  .However, choice in the mental 
health field is severely limited. One approach dominates and that is a belief in chemical 
imbalances, genetic determinism, and psychiatric drugs as the treatment of choice. Far too often 
this limited choice has been exceedingly harmful to both the body and the spirit” (qtd. in Lewis 
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124) In “A Mad Fight,” Bradley Lewis explains that beyond the political struggle, the c/s/x/ 
movement still carries on an epistemological struggle about what states of “severe mental and 
emotional crises” signify. The Adbusters editors’ statement with which he closes his article 
suggests that what the medical model would call “mental illnesses”—“our deep sorrow, our 
manic hope, or fierce anxiety, our imperfect rage,”—are, instead, natural reactions to a 
disordered and unjust world (qtd. in Lewis 128). This view clearly challenges my contention 
above that the effects or “symptoms” of major mental disabilities cannot be considered a part of 
normal living. 
 The claim that posits mental distress states as reactions to cultural factors such as 
isolation and materialism resonates with the views of those disability studies theorists and 
activists who argue for the social model of disability, the idea that disability is a social 
construction rather than a primarily material fact. The social model, Tom Shakespeare explains, 
claims that over and above physical impairment, disability results from structural and 
institutional forces that lead to the societal exclusion of disabled people (215). For example, a 
person who is blind has a clear physical impairment, but a lack of assistive devices, such as 
“talking” crosswalks in her town, is the external reality that disables her. Shakespeare provides a 
critique of this model which includes the contention that in arguing against the medical model of 
disability, the social model goes too far in suggesting that the disabled person’s impairment is 
“not a problem” (217-18).   
 Medical sociologist, Julie Mulvaney, also critiques what she calls the “social approach” 
to what she notes are the very real impairments that constitute mental disability. While she hails 
the way the conception of mental disability as a social construction challenges the traditional 
medical model of the body as the only source of illness, she criticizes sociologists’ avoidance of 
34 
 
 
 
“the dilemmas of confronting the implications that may follow from an acknowledgement that 
some people experience severe pain and discomfort as a result of disorganized thinking, racing 
thoughts, fixed paranoid delusions, inability to control thought processes, or perceptions of 
external thought control. This makes their work increasingly irrelevant for many people 
experiencing serious mental distress.” She argues that sociologists would do well to follow the 
lead of disability theorists who are working to re-inject concepts of impairment into the 
definition of disability (589). Helen Spandler and Jill Anderson call impairment “the elephant in 
the room,” ignored in the work of some disability and “radical mental health activists” because it 
does not fit with the attribution of all disability to the effect of social forces such as 
discrimination (14). 
 In presenting a “human rights approach” to dealing with mental disability, psychiatrist 
Kenneth Burns also speaks to the need to go beyond the purely social model of disability, 
specifically when thinking about mental disability. He cites his support for a model that includes 
both biological and genetic causes for mental disability in interaction with environmental factors: 
“Innate or acquired genetic or biological factors associated with the origins of serious mental 
disabilities are not fixed impairments in the sense that blindness and spinal paralysis are. Rather, 
these factors exist as ‘vulnerability factors’—rendering the individual susceptible to psychosocial 
and environmental factors within society.” Burns points to increases in mental disabilities such 
as anxiety, depression, and substance abuse in relation to structural factors such as poverty, 
homelessness, and unemployment (22). He calls for actions to address these factors and 
concludes his piece with the contention that the medical establishment’s research focus on 
stigma misses the real problem of discrimination (Burns 26-27). While I agree that addressing 
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discrimination is crucial, I believe a continued focus on stigma is also necessary because stigma 
makes discrimination possible and probable. 
The Challenge to the Medical Model Hits Home 
A few weeks after our initial meeting, Gloria and I traveled together to an adjacent 
county for a workshop she had arranged for mentally disabled people who work as “peer 
supports.” From a rhetorical standpoint, I was especially interested in the workshop as it focused 
on how to tell one’s story in public presentations.  I met the peer supports group and was 
introduced around as someone who was researching the Speakers Bureau. Meeting people, I felt 
initial discomfort because a few of the people at the meeting appeared visibly distressed in a way 
I have come to associate with a certain level of mental disability through my work experience as 
someone who provided support to mentally disabled people in low-income housing. My 
discomfort stemmed from a specific (and familiar) feeling of being not “as ill” as the other 
people in the room. What I experienced felt like a form of stigmatization, abhorrent, but still 
there—a desire to distance myself from identification with these more obvious presentations of 
mental disability.  
 I remember in particular a very nice woman seated next to me who repeatedly interrupted 
Gloria’s presentation with breathless exclamations about how excited she was to be participating 
in the training. She said that she was excited about the opportunity to share her story so that 
people can see someone with a “scary diagnosis” (schizophrenia) who is still able to “be very 
functional and lead a normal life.” I remember wondering how “normal” this person’s life could 
be, given her behavior.  At the same time as I felt deeply connected to her desire to send that 
message of normalcy, I wondered about the ways in which her self-presentation, especially her 
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highly nervous affect, would reinforce certain stereotypes—such as the “scattered” nature of a 
mentally disabled person’s thought processes—when she told her story.  
 Gloria presented a text-version of a PowerPoint called “Crafting Your Story: Guidelines 
and Recommendations for Sharing Your Mental Health Experiences.” She offered advice about 
the steps to creating one’s story, with the following goals: to fight stigma, to educate, to help 
others come forward, to create trust. She also mentioned the concept of tailoring one’s message 
to various “power groups,” different sets of people who could affect life for mentally ill people, 
such as policymakers, landlords, and medical professionals. I learned much from the suggestions 
she made about narrating one’s mental health experiences, but here I want to note the things she 
said that gave me pause.  
Under “Do’s, Don’ts and Be Carefuls” her PowerPoint stated: “Don’t overgeneralize 
medication, prayer, specific support groups, or anything else as a cure-all.” Gloria told the group 
to stress to audiences that whatever helped “helped for me.” She added that when talking to 
people about medication, we should remember that taking it is a personal choice, not the only 
way to approach mental disability. Although I am fully aware that medication does not always 
work for people in the ways that it has successfully worked for me, this caution about how to 
discuss medication made me uncomfortable. As a direct care worker serving people with mental 
disabilities, I had seen the highly negative effects of individual decisions to stop taking one’s 
medications. I was not familiar at the time with the arguments made by people within Mad 
studies who strenuously oppose the efforts by medical and social service systems to force 
mentally disabled people to take medications and undergo hospitalization against an individual’s 
will. I also was essentially unaware of the adverse experiences some people have had taking 
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medications.  For example, Irit Shimrat, a Canadian Mad studies scholar, writes in a book 
chapter entitled “The Tragic Farce of ‘Community Mental Health Care”: 
As I write this, a dear friend who was locked up on a suburban psych ward earlier 
this year is being coerced to attend her local Care Team. The Care Team injects 
her with an atypical neuroleptic that is already causing dystonic and cognitive 
difficulties, and tests her blood to ensure that she is maintaining what they call 
therapeutic levels of several other psychiatric drugs they make her take.  
Her outpatient committal order—euphemistically called ‘extended leave’ in 
British Columbia’s Mental Health Act—obliges her to subject herself to this 
ongoing damage and humiliation, on pain of reincarceration if she fails to comply. 
She and far too many others are receiving community mental health services 
because they have no choice (Fabris 2011). 
Reading such a description, I have to admit that when I worked in direct service to people 
with mental disabilities, I was aware of what was locally known as an “assertive treatment 
order,” a legal requirement that someone take their psychiatrically-prescribed medications or 
face hospitalization [what Mad studies scholars would call “incarceration” (Burstow 83)]. At the 
time, I did not question the validity of these orders and certainly did not view them as the human 
rights violations Mad Pride activists and scholars consider them (Costa 206). I only saw them as 
necessary means to get people the medical treatment they needed in order to stop suffering from 
what the medical model calls the “symptoms” of mental illness. In her classroom presentations, 
Gloria refers instead to “what are known as symptoms” when she talks about her mental distress 
experiences, which she calls “states of distress.”   
38 
 
 
 
 The next statement on Gloria’s speakers training PowerPoint was the kicker, however: 
“Don’t promote ‘broken brain’ theory.’” I raised my hand and asked what that caution meant. 
Gloria explained that speakers should not promote the theory that mental disabilities arise from 
chemical imbalances in the brain. She said she did not want to devalue one side of the debate 
about mental disability and its causes, but “these are human beings suffering.” Gloria’s 
affiliation with the Recovery Movement clearly places her on the c/s/x side of the debate. 
Addressing the workshop audience, she described power issues brought up by the primacy of the 
medical model, noting that she had been put in hospitals because of her condition and “treated as 
sick.” She described the “sick role” as something that had been “put on me.” She continued by 
saying that the issues of psychiatric labeling and medical opinions provide good opportunities for 
dialogue, arguing for a balance between respecting the experience of experts within the “system” 
and peoples’ lived experience with mental disability. She brought up the idea that certain “states 
of being” can be considered life experiences rather than “symptoms,” and noted that there are 
varying opinions as to what mental disability is: Is it a medical illness, or is it a “part of living?”  
 Regarding these statements, she told the group that they could mention how medications 
have helped them but should not say, “You must take your meds!” Some people physically 
cannot take them due to side effects, she noted, and some choose not to and find other ways to 
manage their “symptoms.” She mentioned that one of the members of the Speakers Bureau has 
bipolar mood disorder and does not take medications. When this person speaks to groups, she 
makes it clear that this is her personal decision. 
 Gloria’s commentary raised my hackles. I found myself wanting to argue forcefully 
against the idea that mental disability could be considered just another way of being. This idea 
rang false against my experience of mania and especially depression, where I found a depth of 
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sadness and hopelessness unrelated to anything going on in my external reality. “Depression 
feels like an aberration,” I thought, “not a ‘part of living,’” a descriptor that seems to suggest that 
what I consider an illness is an acceptable state rather than one that needs medical intervention.  I 
should note here I do not approach the topic neutrally. My father committed suicide after a long 
period of untreated depression.  
 I raised my concern about the advice to avoid “broken brain theory” with Gloria on the 
way home from the training described above. She explained her view of mental health as a set of 
behaviors that exist on a spectrum of “being human” Certain states, she said, are not symptoms 
of illness so much as “ways of being.” She added that this view of mental illness is the peer 
support model, the model associated with the above-noted movement that trains mentally 
disabled people to provide support services for other mentally disabled people. She also briefly 
described the “psychiatric survivor” movement noting that it has what she called the extreme 
view of mental illness. Mad scholar, Bonnie Burstow, refers more broadly to the antipsychiatry 
movement and argues, in the words of a Mad organization known as the Phoenix Rising 
Collective, that “psychiatric treatment is a form of social control” (84). 
 I told Gloria that my experiences of deep depression included a level of anguish and 
hopelessness that was incommensurate with anything going on in my life. I asked, “Doesn’t that 
suggest that the cause must be biological?” She turned to me and said, “The purists would say 
that you had not looked hard enough for a source for your sadness.” Slap! I politely expressed 
my dissatisfaction with this response, and we let the matter rest there. But inside I was seething, 
not at Gloria, who I had already come to like and respect, but at the “purists” who would dare lay 
their interpretation over my crystal-clear experience. (It has not escaped my notice that I am 
doing the same thing through my interpretation of their mental health experiences.) In an 
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example of looking harder for non-psychiatric sources for one’s sadness, Jennifer Poole and 
Jennifer Ward describe what they call “psychiatric encroachment” when it comes dealing with 
individual experiences of grief after the death of a loved one: “It follows that the medicalization 
of grief has been on the rise, too, with more and more ‘types’ of grief making their way into the 
psychiatric manual known as the DSM. With inclusion come medical diagnoses and treatments, 
including ‘therapeutic’ pharmaceuticals meant to ease, numb, and control ‘symptoms’ of grief” 
(98). Poole and Ward challenge the medical model’s tendency to affix a clinical diagnosis to 
mood states. 
Terminology and Identity/Seeking Rhetorical Distance 
 As my strong response to Gloria’s negation of “broken brain theory” indicates, I did not 
want that medical model challenged. Why? At that moment, I only knew I feared a challenge 
because I had thus far negotiated my sense of identity within the context of this model. I had 
viewed myself as a person with a mental illness, not a “mentally ill person.” The latter wording 
suggested to me that the illness formed the primary part of my identity, subsuming all other 
aspects of the roles through which I interact with others. As something wholly biological, 
however, I believed bipolar mood disorder did not affect my true identity in any way. The 
disease affected how I had to live my life, the precautions I had to take, the limits I had to be 
conscious of—but it did not have anything to do with who I really am. My sense of having a 
“true identity” is echoed by Hutchins and Kirk. They argue in the following way for the 
importance of their critique of the way the DSM is used to label certain mental states: "In short, 
diagnoses for physical ailments rarely have the social consequences that diagnoses for mental 
illnesses do. This is because how you think, feel, and behave is what you believe constitutes your 
"real" self: it is your essence as a human being" (262).  
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If one believes in the medical model, however, it is possible to distance oneself 
conceptually and rhetorically from one’s psychiatric diagnosis. It can be considered something 
one “has” rather than something one “is.” For example, Phil, the Speakers Bureau founder, once 
adamantly told me “I am not schizophrenic. I have schizophrenia.”  When he presents to high 
school audiences, he says, “I have a mental illness—paranoid schizophrenia.” And each time I 
give a classroom presentation, I start out by saying “I have a bipolar mood disorder,” rather than 
“I am bipolar.” Identifying myself in this way is a conscious choice, one designed to put distance 
between my “real” self, my essence as a human being, and my psychiatric condition. Ultimately, 
both Phil and I suggest that our identities would remain unchanged today if our disabilities 
somehow suddenly disappeared. By verbally creating distance in the classroom between our 
selves and our psychiatric diagnoses, we attempt to counter the mark we bear because of those 
diagnoses.  
In rhetorical terms, we try to add to our ethos as speakers by distancing ourselves from 
conditions we know much of the public tends to view as “bad.” It is not that we are bipolar or 
paranoid schizophrenic, i.e. bad, people. We are simply people who have these conditions. They 
are a part of our lives, our wording argues, but they do not define who we are. One of the 
Bureau’s speakers, Megan, makes this argument directly. She started the presentation I taped by 
saying, “I can tell you a little bit of my history, and I’ll throw some diagnoses at you. I hope that 
doesn’t define me in your mind. But I live with what’s called Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.” 
(emphasis added). Another speaker, Ben, tells students early in his presentation, “What I’ve got 
is called “schizoaffective disorder.” Johnson underscores the need for such rhetorical distancing 
when she notes that Eagleton’s detractors did not consider his ethos rehabilitated even when 
treatment had rid him of all symptoms of his mental disability. As she explains, “A diagnosis of 
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mental illness, no matter how far in the past, no matter the severity of the condition, no matter 
the circumstances, is a permanent identity. One ‘has,’ or ‘suffers from,’ heart disease. One is 
perceived ‘to be’ mentally ill even after successful treatment” (Johnson 468). Speakers Bureau 
members face this exact challenge to our ethos even as we tell our audiences we have achieved 
wellness through the use of medications. The medical model’s contention that one must take 
medication for the rest of one’s life to maintain that wellness does not help us create an image of 
people free from the initial stigmatizing diagnosis. 
I consider the described verbal distancing, the statement “I have X” vs. “I am X,” a 
necessary rhetorical move on the part of Speakers Bureau members. We need to be perceived by 
audiences as Quintillian’s “good man speaking well.” We know stigma has likely marked us as 
“bad,” in the views of a significant portion of our audience. Those of us who subscribe to the 
medical model of mental illness “come out swinging” in our presentations by using a seemingly 
small rhetorical choice designed to guide audience perceptions in our favor. 
In contrast to the five other participants in my study, who all begin our presentations 
using such tropes of the medical model to describe ourselves, Gloria opens in the following way: 
“I’m here because I have a lot of experience with what is known as mental illness. I have a lot of 
experience dealing with the mental health system, and I have a lot of experience with pain and 
human conditions of distress.” By mentioning having had painful and distressing experiences 
rather than giving the name of a specific illness, Gloria discloses more of her self than the other 
speakers do. She does not use clinical terminology that can put distance between life events and 
the person presenting them. Throughout her talk, she refers to “experiences” she has had in her 
life rather than to “symptoms” of her mental disability. She also argues that what the medical 
model would call her “illness” is, rather, an aspect of her individuality: 
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There’s no normal life. We’re all individuals. I think that concept of being an 
individual and having differences, diversity in general, that we’re all different in 
some aspect although there are many parts of us that make us human. . . There are 
many parts of us that make us different from each other. That’s ok. We don’t have 
to be the same. Diversity is beautiful and differences are beautiful. They don’t 
always have to be medicated or diagnosed. I think sometimes that can be helpful. 
I’ve experienced ways in which it is not helpful, too.  
By describing her diagnosed disability as an aspect of diversity rather than a defect, a veering 
from “normal,” Gloria puts less distance between that diagnosis and her self than the other 
speakers do. In a second interview, she did mention that she does not go as far as to say, “I am 
schizophrenic” in classroom presentations, as she believes doing so will be too stigmatizing in 
front of relatively unsophisticated audiences. She reserves this assertion of identity for times 
when she is in the company of other people with the same disability, the “in-group” where such a 
reference feels safe because it will not be misinterpreted. She added that she will also say “I am 
schizophrenic” in conversations where she wants to invoke her own Mad Pride, such as at times 
when she feels threatened by doctors or nurses. 
The idea that the mentally disabled speaker needs to rhetorically distance himself from 
his condition also meets a challenge when examined in light of certain disability studies 
discussions of identity.  As Shakespeare explains, proponents of the social model of disability do 
not call themselves “disabled people” (rather than “people with disabilities”) to suggest an 
“essence” of disability, as I fear the term “mentally ill person” would do. Rather, they do so to 
indicate that, while they have real impairments, they have only been disabled by the structures 
and exclusions imposed by an ableist society. For these advocates, “[l]ike gender, disability is a 
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culturally and historically specific phenomenon, not a universal and unchanging essence” 
(Shakespeare 216). Seen in this light, the way I view my disability through the medical model’s 
lens—as an individualized defect—does suggest it is part of my essence, part of who I am. 
 Siebers contributes to the view of disability identity as something other than an essence in 
his argument for the importance of identity politics for people with disabilities. He challenges the 
contention that politics based on identities that deal with pain and suffering should be considered 
narcissistic (286). He states instead that identity politics are the best way to fight injustice against 
minority groups and contribute their experiences to the construction of “progressive, democratic 
society” (Siebers 283). Rather than being pure essences that determine our individuality, he 
notes, “identity” refers to “the structure by which [a] person identifies and becomes identified 
with a set of social narratives, ideas, myths values, and types of knowledge of varying reliability, 
usefulness and verifiability. It represents the means by which a person, qua individual, comes to 
join a particular social body” (Siebers 283-84).  
 Siebers’ description of identity as the intersection between an individual’s consciousness 
and a set of cultural elements such as social narratives links to the rhetorical labor of the 
Speakers Bureau.  Each speaker’s presentation of their story of mental disability hinges on the 
intersection of personal disability experience with either the medical narrative of mental illness 
or the alternative c/s/x narrative of states of mental distress.  Speakers Bureau members all use 
our rhetoric to fight back against the stigmatized cultural narrative of mental disability. By 
attempting to change the way our audiences perceive mentally disabled people, by selling them 
on alternative versions of what it means to have a mental disability, we try, through language, to 
change the way in which, as Siebers puts it, we join the social body from which our disabilities 
may have excluded us. But each of us make a choice regarding whether to speak of ourselves as 
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“ill” or as experiencing a “different way of being human” on a spectrum of ways of being 
human. 
 Susan Gabel asserts her right to define herself in relationship to her disability rhetorically, 
as Bureau members do. She asserts her right to the claim “I am disabled” as it relates to her 
experience with depression. She refers to the medication she must take daily and the rest she has 
to get as indices of her disability. She needs both in order to function (Gabel 39). Gabel brushes 
aside the term “person with a disability” as one that makes it unclear whether or not the disability 
is part of the person’s identity. Unlike the five speakers who subscribe to the medical model, she 
clearly sees her disability as part of her identity.  She also rejects the designation “mentally ill,” 
she notes, because she experiences her illness physically as well as mentally and because the 
illness only occurs intermittently. “Mentally ill,” she argues, suggests a constant state of 
suffering. (Gabel 40).  Primarily, she calls for what she calls a “body-centered interpretation of 
identity as an experience,” explaining:  
  In saying ‘I am disabled’, I am constructing my body through experience and I am 
  interpreting my body and experience to my self and others in a certain way.  
  Disabled-ness holds particular meaning for me and ‘disability’ refers to   
  experiences of my body that contribute to the meanings I construct of the self. I  
  may use other words to represent concepts that describe other meanings   
  associated with my experiences, and those, too, will have value for me, but when I 
  use ‘disabled’ to describe myself, I am valuing disability and the disabled parts of  
  me. I am saying that experiences of disability are important in the struggle to  
  know my self and to make sense of my body’s experiences .  .  . I am making a  
  place for my self in the world and in relation to other people. (Gabel 44) 
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Like Gabel, the Speakers Bureau rhetors interpret our experiences with mental disability to 
student audiences. We do so to win acceptance for people with these disorders in the larger 
culture of “normals.” In this rhetorical struggle, how we describe our selves in relation to our 
conditions matters. 
 While it might seem like a fine point, I find Gabel’s dismissal of the term “mentally ill” 
particularly helpful in terms of thinking of my own sense of identity as it relates to what I have 
not yet called my “disability.” My refusal to identify as “mentally ill” derives from my fortunate 
health history. After two major episodes of illness in my early 20s, I have remained relatively 
healthy since, with only a few “dips” now and again. When I have experienced symptoms of my 
illness, I readily identified as sick. But in the intermittent years, feeling well has given me the 
ability to put at least some distance between myself and my diagnostic label. Reading Gabel’s 
argument, however, I have to come to grips with the fact that my experiences, even down to 
having to take medication daily in order to maintain my emotional stability, do indicate the 
presence of disability. Like her, I require assistive measures in order to function well. And 
whereas she monitors her thought processes to determine if her illness is having an impact on 
others, I regularly monitor my mood to watch for telltale signs of a recurrence of illness that 
needs prompt (medical) attention (Gabel 39). So, following her lead, I will try on the phrase “I 
am disabled” as a way to speak about myself in public settings.  
Rhetorical Poses in the Classroom 
 The decision to join the Speakers Bureau put my disability front and center. I had to 
reflect on it significantly in order to make my contribution to the group. My next encounter with 
a member of the Bureau came when I drove with Phil to tape his presentation at a local high 
school. As the only speaker that day, he had an entire hour to present. When we arrived at the 
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school, Phil went up to the front desk and announced that we were there to speak in Ms. 
Henderson’s class. I was already feeling self-conscious as a middle-aged person walking into a 
building full of high school students rushing up and down the halls.  But when Phil announced 
us, I felt a different kind of self-consciousness. Specifically, I wondered if the woman working 
the front desk knew that we were the mentally disabled speakers. I tried to read her face to see if 
she was covering up any discomfort with politeness. This did not seem to be the case, but in 
retrospect I am struck by the way even the slightest possibility of stigma made me feel ill at ease. 
 After putting on visitor badges, Phil and I made our way to the classroom. The teacher 
introduced us and explained that I would be taping Phil’s presentation for my research. Before he 
started speaking, Phil spent a while at the chalkboard writing down four phone numbers, hotlines 
for mental health crisis help. He began his presentation not by introducing himself but by 
explaining the numbers. Regarding the Psychiatric Emergency Services line, he said, “Say 
you’re suicidal. We want to help you. They can talk you through your difficulty.”  His initial use 
of “we” made me wonder how he viewed his role as a member of the Speakers Bureau. Did he 
identify himself as part of the spectrum of support services available locally to people with 
mental disabilities? If so, Phil seemed to assume the rhetorical pose of “expert” right from the 
beginning of his speech. 
  I listened to his presentation carefully for assistance in considering how to develop my 
own. Only after describing the hotlines, the services they offered, and informational resources 
available through NAMI did Phil introduce himself by name.  He immediately followed by 
saying that he had a mental illness, specifically paranoid schizophrenia. I had made the error of 
sitting behind the students for Phil’s presentation, so I did not catch their reaction to his 
disclosure. I do remember wondering what they might be thinking as they listened to someone 
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say he had one of the decidedly “scary” diagnoses. The public sphere representations of paranoid 
schizophrenia I have encountered are rarely kind and usually refer to the person’s potential for 
violence. Journalist Rob Wipond also notes the common media conflation of mental disability 
with violence and crime (254) The matter-of-fact way Phil named his illness impressed me. It 
reminded me that in certain moments of self-disclosure, if I am not particularly close to the 
person with whom I am speaking, I will omit the “bipolar” part of my diagnosis and just say I 
suffer from depression. After all, bipolar mood disorder, with its attached images of wild mood 
swings, also falls on the scary side of the diagnosis spectrum, although perhaps not as scary as 
paranoid schizophrenia.  
 Phil’s style of speaking was both teacherlike and methodical. He may have chosen this 
style to shore up his ethos by highlighting his competence to provide information about mental 
illness. Phil presented many statistics about the national rates of various mental illnesses and 
stopped intermittently to quiz the students, asking “Who here knows someone with a mental 
illness? Who here can name some of the major mental illnesses?” By speaking like an 
expert/teacher, he may have been seeking to distance the identity he was constructing for the 
students from the frightening images the words “paranoid schizophrenia” may have brought up 
for them. I connected his style of presentation with the goal he stated partway through his 
speech: “I want you to understand mental illness to the best of your ability.” Spandler and 
Anderson offer two definitions of “understanding” as it relates to mental disability: 
“comprehending the nature of madness or distress” and “sympathetic awareness, compassion and 
tolerance (of oneself and others)” (24). The first part of Phil’s speech seemed to aim for eliciting 
the former kind of understanding from its audience. 
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 Unlike Gloria, whose speech mentions her participation in the Recovery Movement, 
Phil’s presentation put him firmly in the medical model camp. He stated that he has made it his 
personal project to understand “the biological roots of mental illness” by doing Google searches 
related to neurobiology. He described the “symptoms” of his illness in clinical terms and only 
then followed up by giving brief examples of occurrences of those symptoms in his life. Phil’s 
presentation did not contain any suggestion that there might be other ways of perceiving mental 
disability outside of the medical model. Strangely, this omission made me uncomfortable even 
though, only a few weeks earlier, I had struggled with Gloria’s explanation of the “recovery” and 
“psychiatric survivor” models. Now, it struck me as limiting to present high school students with 
only one view of mental disability, albeit the dominant one, without at least mentioning that 
others do exist. As participants in psychology classes, these students had probably only 
encountered the medical model. I wondered about the consequences of lacking access to 
alternative conceptions of mental disability. If the alternative vision of the workings of mental 
disability proves, in the end, more powerful in the fight against stigma than the traditional one, 
would it not be important for students to have access to that vision?  
 Later in the week, as I prepared for my first presentation, the nervousness hit. While 
comfortable with self-disclosure to intimates, the idea of standing in front of a group of 
strangers, young people especially, and identifying myself as someone with a mental illness 
suddenly seemed daunting. I had planned my anecdotes carefully to convey the reality of my 
experience, but what would the students think of me after hearing them? And what did they 
think, what did they expect, before I even stepped in the room? Very conscious that the audience 
might be made up of people with preconceived notions—from media images, from textbooks, 
and possibly from personal experience with ill family or friends—I wondered what I could 
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achieve in the space of 20 minutes to counteract all that conditioning. The question “What will 
they think of me?” certainly suggests the existence of shame, although I can say with confidence 
that I do not feel any shame about my illness, at least on a conscious level. Caring about the 
students’ opinion of me, though, does suggest that shame lurks somewhere, at least 
subconsciously.  
The idea of shame accompanying a mental health diagnosis fits the medical model’s 
contention that mental illnesses are individually-based, medical defects. If I held to the c/s/x 
view of my condition, the action of disclosing my experience with “states of mental distress” 
could be a matter of pride, as it is for members of the Icarus Project, “a support network and 
education project by and for people who experience the world in ways that are often diagnosed 
as mental illness.” According to the project’s web page: “Sensitivities, visions, and inspirations 
are not necessarily symptoms of illness, they are gifts needing cultivation and care. When 
honored and nurtured, these gifts can lay the foundation for a wiser and more compassionate 
society.”  
 Coming from the medical model, which casts my “illness” as a defect in need of 
remediation, I felt no such sense of pride. Instead, I remember almost regretting the decision to 
participate in the Speakers Bureau’s regular exercises in self-disclosure. Feeling the moment 
approaching, I realized how much I enjoyed what PhebeAnn Wolframe calls “sane privilege,” 
the ability of sane people to behave in certain ways, such as “[showing] too much anxiety, or 
social awkwardness, or eccentricity” in a medical establishment without being subjected to a 
psychiatric evaluation the way a person with a mental health history would be (8). As someone 
who does not bear visible signs of being “different” from the norm, I, like the other study 
participants, have sane privilege. This privilege brings with it a great sense of safety.  Even 
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though I knew the Speakers Bureau involved minimal risk—it was unlikely I would see any of 
the students again—disclosure about a still-stigmatized condition felt dangerous.  
Specifically, letting strangers know about my illness felt like a threat to my image of 
myself. I had spent almost 25 years without a severe episode of illness, almost 11 without a 
significant one, and about a year since what my husband and I call a “blip.” I liked the distance I 
could at least attempt in my mind between my day-to-day experiences and the potential time 
bomb of my biological reality. Preparing to speak, I started to worry: What would it be like to 
talk about difficult experiences, regardless of how far in the past, to a classroom full of eyes and 
ears? If I shared the wrong detail, would I lose control of my self-image? Would the circulating 
stigma about mental disability adhere to me the minute I opened my mouth? Would discourse 
keep an uncomfortable reality constantly in the present? And would “talking about” lead to “re-
living” in some way? 
  Driving to my first presentation, I experienced significant nervousness. As I entered the 
classroom, where I had been earlier in the day to tape another speaker, Ruth, I met friendly 
smiles from some of the girls in the class. The students’ desks, arranged in a horseshoe shape, 
faced the front, where I perched on a small stool. As latecomers filed in, I found my hands 
shaking from a combination of nerves and strong coffee. I had forgotten to bring along the 
handkerchief I always keep around due to often sweaty hands, so my notes started to get wet. 
Nonetheless, I jumped in after pressing the button on the digital recorder and hearing the teacher 
say, “Go for it!” 
 I started off in a way designed to block the possibility that the audience might reduce my 
identity to my “defect.” I stated my name and then said, “Just like you, I wear many hats. By this 
I mean I play many roles in my life. Right now, my primary role is that of a Ph.D. student. I’m 
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also a teacher, a wife, a sister.  But today I’m here speaking to you because I am a person with a 
mental illness—bipolar mood disorder.” I then launched into a description of what mania and 
depression feel like. I realize now that I made confident, definitive statements about my illness 
such as “The hallmark of depression is an absolute lack of hope. You feel like there is no way the 
despair that you feel is ever going to end.” I did the same when describing the highs of mania, 
even adding that the first time one experiences mania, it can almost be enjoyable because of the 
sensory enhancement and seemingly brilliant thinking it brings into one’s life. I described the 
two poles of my illness as if the way I experienced them was the way that everyone who has my 
diagnosis experiences them. I believe this rhetorical choice comes from my attachment to the 
clinical model of mental illness—where symptoms seem to be described as standardized. I had 
heard enough descriptions of “racing and/or tangential thoughts, delusions of grandeur, enhanced 
perception of colors and sounds, etc.” to be able to reproduce the language for the students. 
 As I continued to talk, describing my worst symptoms, my treatments, the healing 
process, the things that can help a person with a mental illness have a good quality of life, I 
found that my nervousness did not lessen. I did however experience a new sensation, the feeling 
of being an expert. The students seemed very attentive. I noticed no one yawning or talking to a 
classmate, so I chose to believe that they were paying relatively close attention. I started to feel 
like I had the ability to tell them what mental illness is like, while at the same time being aware 
of the huge amount of detail I had to leave out due to lack of time. I had the sensation of being 
the expert speaking the truth, not my truth but the truth about bipolar mood disorder. In 
retrospect, I believe this rhetorical pose allowed me the same kind of distance from my diagnosis 
that Phil may have been aiming for by staring off his presentation with a listing of mental health 
resources and statistics. Perhaps we felt the distance made possible by the expert pose aided our 
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damaged ethos. Ben began his presentation with a brief history lesson of the ways in which 
mental illness has been conceptualized and treated over the centuries. While decidedly useful in 
orienting students, this choice of content also strikes me as an attempt by Ben, too, to bolster his 
ethos by establishing himself early on as an expert on mental disability.  
Gloria did not position herself as an expert through her speeches. Instead, she spoke to 
the students in ways that indicate her stance as a rebel against the medical model. She spoke with 
excitement about the Recovery Movement, comparing it to other struggles for social justice: 
I consider myself a part of a movement known as the Recovery Movement.  .  . 
And the Recovery Movement says that despite these experiences being, um, 
treated as medical conditions, that there’s a different way of looking at things. 
That opposed to labeling differences as disorders, people in the Recovery 
Movement look at mental health and health in general as part of a continuum, 
where people move along, everyone, whether you have a mental health diagnosis 
or not. Everyone kind of moves along this continuum, that parts of their life they 
feel better than other parts of their life. There’s all sorts of reasons for moving 
back and forth on this continuum .  .  . To me it’s a civil rights movement. I don’t 
know if you guys are familiar. But people used to be diagnosed as homosexuals. 
And it was not doctors who sat around and decided that homosexuals aren’t a 
different kind of people. It was a gay movement that came about``. They said we 
don’t want to be diagnosed, we want to be accepted as we are. And they are still 
fighting but they are gaining rights at this point. So, I see this as a movement like 
that, and I hope that we’ll continue to develop so that people will accept people 
that are maybe different. And that’s not to say that I am against the medical 
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movement or against medication or against any form of mental health treatment. 
It’s just to say that people should have a choice about whether to take these 
medications of get these treatments. Because a lot of times, these things are forced 
on people. A lot of times they’re seen as the only option and the only coping 
strategy. That I disagree with.  
Gloria’s rhetorical pose of rebel against the medical model that students have been studying may 
strengthen her ethos for some members of her audience, although others may find themselves 
wary of embracing a seemingly radical perspective. 
At certain points of my talk, I did not feel the comfort of seeming like an expert.  When I 
offered students examples of my aberrant behavior while ill, I felt the very uncomfortable 
sensation of having my skin peeled away from my body—of losing my protective coating, so to 
speak. I believed I had to tell the story of my psychotic break, even though it lasted only a day, 
because I wanted the students to understand how bad mental illness can be. Looking back, I also 
wonder if I was seeking a certain amount of mental illness “street cred” by describing that time I 
walked around town in my pajamas at 3 am, carrying a glass pop bottle to break and use as a 
weapon in case I was attacked. I told them how I got into the car of a man I didn’t know who 
offered to help me out by giving me a ride. I told them how incredibly lucky I was that the man 
took me to a friend’s house, as I had asked, rather than being someone who meant me harm.  
Using the terms “psychosis” and “psychotic break” as well as “delusional thinking” felt 
extremely scary as I sat in front of the students because I could not read their minds to know how 
they might be shifting their opinion of me. Could my choice of anecdotes lead to the opinion: 
“Once a delusional thinker always a delusional thinker?” I did not know, and I found myself 
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searching the faces in front of me for any clue of audience reaction. Only polite and attentive 
faces looked back, with the occasional, greatly appreciated, supportive smile.  
That I cared about the students’ opinion of me reveals my sense of the potential for them 
to make a leap between my diagnosis and a judgement of who I am as a person. Besides the 
“expert” rhetorical stance, I have noticed I aim for a chronologically distanced positioning from 
my illness as well. It is very important to me to stress to audiences that my two main experiences 
with mental illness occurred decades ago and that I have been essentially well since. Establishing 
this distance through the content of my speeches allows me to present myself in a way I feel is 
less open to stigma. I am aware that I invoke this distancing pose in this text as well with my 
explanations of not having had anything but the occasional “blip” of illness for years. 
  Sitting on my perch in front of the students on that first day, I felt like a bug brought in 
for inspection by a class that had recently studied the bodily workings of that bug in textbooks. 
Unlike a bug, however, I did have the use of words to try to describe my experience. During my 
time of speaking to classrooms, I have wondered what kinds of words, what combinations, what 
content, what styles of speaking will get the bug to seem fully human to its observers. I should 
stress that I felt human sitting up front that first day and on following ones. That was never in 
question. But I have wondered what I could say that would reveal me as fully human, as fully 
capable goods rather than damaged ones.  
 This chapter examines the rhetorical representation of identity as practiced by members 
of the Speakers Bureau and links that representation to where each rhetor stands with respect to 
two competing views of the nature of what is known as mental illness or mental disability. In 
terms of the phenomenon of narrating one’s mental illness experience in public, examining my 
own experience has helped me discover the existence of a strong sense of self-stigma. I attribute 
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this to the medical model’s conceptualization of “mental illness” as a defect, even as I retain my 
belief in that model and depend on medication for maintenance of my psychiatric stability. For 
example, I wonder before and during each presentation “What will they think of me?” At the 
very beginning of each talk, before even mentioning illness, I make sure to mention that I am 
pursuing a Ph.D. I do so to counterbalance the presumption that a mentally ill person is incapable 
of a high level of achievement.  
Before undertaking this study, I had not considered my illness a primary part of my 
identity. I had not expected to care deeply how anonymous groups of high school students might 
assess me as a person. I also did not expect that sharing the details of my story would begin to 
grow tiresome, even over the course of just four presentations. I found myself longing to get 
away from that picture of myself and back to the life I now lead. While exciting as something 
potentially useful in the fight against stigma, each speaking opportunity reminds me that, at least 
according to medical and public standards, I am “not normal,” as a former co-worker once 
remarked when she said I should work in a flower shop rather than in the social work setting we 
shared.  
Nonetheless, I find that after conducting my research and participating in the rhetorical 
work of the Speaker’s Bureau, I have emerged with a greater acceptance of my identity as 
mentally disabled. As noted, I have tried on Gabel’s statement “I am disabled,” and have found 
that it fits comfortably. Yes, sharing the details of my disability on a regular basis reminds me 
that indeed, I am not “normal,” or, to use a more accurate term, “neurotypical.” But as I heard a 
Speakers Bureau member say recently, “Normal ain’t nothing but a setting on the dryer!” 
Despite my growing comfort with my identity as someone with a mental disability, each 
classroom speaking opportunity with the Bureau still feels risky. In Chapter Three, I examine the 
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risks Speakers Bureau members take by participating in what I call “deep disclosure” of our 
experiences with mental disability. I move from a discussion of those risks to an assessment of 
the benefits that deep disclosure can hold, in the right circumstances, for both mentally disabled 
rhetors and our audiences.  
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CHAPTER 3 DEEP DISCLOSURE, VULNERABILITY, AND RHETORICAL AGENCY 
In Chapter Two, I explored the rhetorical means Speakers Bureau members use to 
represent the relationship between our personal identities and our mental disabilities. I argued 
that our self- representations depend on the model of mental disability to which a speaker 
subscribes. In an attempt to bolster an ethos which psychiatric diagnoses have damaged, each 
speaker uses the rhetorical moves I described to frame our individual classroom presentations. In 
this chapter, I turn to the “meat” of the presentations, the narration of “what it is like” to have a 
mental disability. These descriptions of the sometimes-disturbing symptoms or effects of mental 
disability have the potential to damage a speaker’s ethos. Nonetheless, members of the Speakers 
Bureau rely on these narratives as our primary stigma-fighting tool. In this chapter, I argue that 
rather than having a counterproductive effect, disclosure of the troubling details of mental 
disability might influence speaker credibility in ways that lead to potentially generative 
vulnerabilities, ones that aid the fight against stigma in the classroom context. 
In considering the Speakers Bureau’s struggles with the issue of ethos, I find myself 
repeatedly drawn to the challenge posed by Prendergast’s assessment of the mentally disabled 
person’s basic lack of credibility in the eyes of the public--“If people think you’re crazy, they 
don’t listen to you” (57). For example, in terms of judgements passed by those in positions of 
authority, such as psychiatrists or court officials, she observes that the writing of schizophrenic 
people has no “transactional worth” (57). It is language that is not taken seriously outside of 
itself. To break through stigma and achieve the full dignity we seek, Speakers Bureau members 
need our audiences to listen to and take seriously what we have to say about ourselves and our 
place in the culture. Accordingly, we take rhetorical measures to construct the ethos Prendergast 
notes that our diagnoses deny us. 
59 
 
 
 
The cultural stigmatization of mental disability guarantees that the challenge to a 
speaker’s credibility begins as soon as she reveals her condition, something each Bureau member 
does at the beginning of each classroom presentation. Like Prendergast, other scholars emphasize 
the risk to ethos inherent in the disclosure of what are described as “invisible disabilities” 
(Pilling 5). In Chapter One I described Johnson’s assessment of the negative repercussions 
experienced by vice-presidential candidate Terry Eagleton when news of Eagleton’s treatment 
for depression became public. Johnson uses the term kakoethos in referring to Eagleton’s 
immediate loss of credibility in the public eye despite his disability being a thing of the past 
(468). Kimberly Myers expresses the need for caution in presenting information about chronic 
illnesses to strangers who do not already know one’s professional and social competence, 
because negative judgements of one’s ability in these arenas may follow (258). And Stephanie 
Kerschbaum presents the following important observation: “The reality is that disability to many 
still signals disqualification. Thus, because identity and agency are rhetorically constructed 
through mutual interaction and because many audiences still understand disability as 
incompetence, disclosures run the risk of undermining one’s ethos” (69). 
While these assessments of the vulnerability inherent in disability disclosure certainly 
ring true in a culture that stigmatizes disability to the extent that ours does, what I have not seen 
is discussion of the potentially positive impact of mental disability disclosure. Members of the 
Speakers Bureau all base our attempts to persuade audiences to accept us as equals on the 
sharing of specific details of our experiences with mental disability. We offer student audiences 
varying levels of what I call “deep disclosure,” presentation of intimate details of the thoughts, 
emotions, and behaviors that mark what psychiatry would call our “episodes” of mental 
disability. As noted above, we take a significant risk in choosing this rhetorical tactic. 
60 
 
 
 
Illustrations of psychological breaks from what the dominant culture calls “reality” can affect an 
audience’s perception of a speaker’s ability to accurately depict his or her disability. And the 
presentation of the disturbing effects of those disabilities can turn at least some members of any 
audience off. By choosing deep disclosure, Speakers Bureau members make ourselves 
vulnerable to these outcomes. Nonetheless, we turn to deep disclosure seeking a specific payoff. 
As the speakers I worked with indicated in both interviews and rhetorical analyses of transcripts 
of their speeches, the goal is to get the audience to believe our individual depictions of how 
mental disability affects our lives. We want that belief to help audience members reach through 
the barrier thrown up by stigma and draw closer to us as human beings. 
In what follows, I examine the work of two Speakers Bureau members, Phil and Ruth, 
chosen because their presentations offer listeners varying degrees of deep disclosure. By paying 
close attention to rhetorical choices these two speakers make, I seek to extend research that 
theorizes ethos in terms of vulnerability, thereby calling into question the idea that disability 
disclosure should always be thought of in terms of risk. Instead, I make the argument that 
through deep disclosure, a mentally ill speaker can add to rather than damage his ethos. Yes, 
deep disclosure does leave that ethos vulnerable to damage, but vulnerability can be something 
beneficial in instances when it moves the speaker closer to the audience’s ability to embrace or 
reject his plea for acceptance. By understanding the benefits of deep disclosure in the fight 
against stigma, both rhetorical and disability studies can gain a needed weapon in the struggle to 
make the truths of some of the still marginalized members of our culture meaningful to those 
whom sociologist Irving Goffman long ago termed the “normals” (24). This possibility serves 
not only a goal of both disciplines but a crucial community need as well. 
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As rhetors operating under the constraints of stigma, Speakers Bureau members have a 
huge stake in Prendergast’s assessment— “If people think you’re crazy, they don’t listen to you.” 
We want audiences to listen to us because we are “crazy,” crazy but also rhetorically attuned. By 
this I mean that while we all experience periods of disconnection from what the dominant culture 
would call “reality,” periods of varying length, our experiences have also given us a strong 
awareness of the ways in which the stigma surrounding mental disability may have damaged our 
credibility. In what follows, I show both how we have internalized this awareness and how we 
attempt to bolster our credibility through the rhetorical stance of deep disclosure. Ours is a 
paradoxical task, however. At the same time as we need to persuade the audience that we are 
indeed “crazy,” through credible narrative constructions of mentally disabled selves, we have to 
imbue those selves with the ethos or believability that can contradict the cultural notion that the 
crazy are not to be believed. Without this, our anti-stigma message will miss the mark.  
The body of this chapter begins with an elaboration of three key concepts: ethos, deep 
disclosure, and vulnerability. I follow with description of how two speakers navigate the use of 
disclosure in their classroom presentations, emphasizing how one person makes no effort to 
shore up the credibility that deep disclosure can damage while the other does take steps to protect 
himself from that potential outcome. I follow this exploration of speaker vulnerability with one 
focused on ways in which the audiences of our presentations might find themselves vulnerable in 
ways both seemingly negative and potentially positive. Finally, I move to an explanation of how 
vulnerability on the part of both the speakers and their audience members, positively reimagined, 
can reap benefits in the form of lessening the perceptual distance between the two. Through my 
explanation of the workings of deep disclosure, I make the overarching argument that mentally 
disabled speakers should push for the greater vulnerability inherent in this technique because 
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doing so creates an opportunity for at least some audience members to better understand and 
therefore more fully accept a stigmatized “other.” 
Throughout the essay, in discussing what I imagine might take place in the classrooms 
we enter, I offer images of symbolic, rhetorical movement. I describe Ruth and Phil as offering 
varying degrees of narrative disclosure in the hope that at least some in the audience may choose 
to “move closer to,” or empathize with, them as human beings. In her discussion of narratives in 
political work, Francesca Poletta describes a legal theorist’s explanation of the workings of 
empathy: 
.  .  . Henderson argues that effective narratives produce an empathetic 
understanding in their audiences. They make it possible for audiences to put 
themselves in the narrator’s shoes and to understand her experience 
“phenomenologically,” and in all its particularity. When that happens, Henderson 
goes on, it becomes impossible to stereotype the narrator or her experience. 
Instead, audiences find themselves obliged to think about the law not abstractly 
but in terms of its effects on real people. Empathetic narratives have the same 
effect on legal decision makers, Henderson argues, pushing them to jettison the 
stereotypes that inhibit just decisions. (126) 
If we substitute “stigma” for “the law” above, and “those who stigmatize” for “legal decision 
makers,” we can see how this description of the relationship between narrative and empathy 
applies equally to the anti-stigma work of the Speakers Bureau. 
Ethos, Deep Disclosure, Vulnerability 
In keeping with our understanding that students may expect people with certain diagnoses 
to exhibit erratic speech or behavior, Bureau members are careful to speak calmly and coherently 
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during our presentations. For example, I know that after I tell students I have a bipolar mood 
disorder, they may expect me to speak in the rapid-fire, highly tangential way associated with 
that diagnosis. Instead, I make sure my speech is measured and my presentation well-organized. 
Rather than being the “bad man speaking poorly” that Johnson says audiences need to learn how 
to accommodate in instances when the speaker has a disability such as mental disability, 
Speakers Bureau members work hard to come across as the “good man speaking well” (476). 
At the same time as we convey this image, which in and of itself has stereotype-fighting 
power, we have to persuade our audiences that the person in front of them at times experiences a 
complete breakdown of the full rationality currently on display. Our madness has to be credible. 
We have to achieve this rhetorical effect because each of us seeks to convey the message: “I am 
a face of mental disability. I represent what mental disability looks like although I am not 
experiencing what are known as ‘symptoms’ right now.” We construct this message carefully 
through deep disclosure of the details, the emotions, thoughts, and behaviors we experience 
when we “experience an episode.”  
As Gloria explains: “You have to tell them the things you go through.  That’s what really 
captures audiences, when you’re really good at telling them what you go through . . . Invite them 
in and be gracious. Show them what is what. I’m speaking very symbolically here. Show them 
this is what depression is. This is what it looks like. This is what it smells like.” By saying one 
must be gracious, Gloria refers to the need to generously share what we have to give—the 
intimate details of difficult periods in our lives. We should invite the listener into our experiences 
by recreating them vividly, so the audience is “captured.” In other words, the speaker who excels 
at this kind of deep description hopes to get members of the audience to draw closer to the 
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors being described. If the audience cannot touch the speaker’s 
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experience, so to speak, it might at least begin to imagine and therefore recognize a human 
reality different from its own.  
As soon as a speaker has convinced audience members of the existence of her mental 
disability through deep disclosure, however, she runs into the problem described by 
Kerschbaum—many people still equate a disclosure of disability with incompetence. Disclosure 
of mental disability can make Speakers Bureau members vulnerable to a damaged ethos because 
our disabilities are thought to affect our connection to reality. Even though mental disabilities 
express themselves episodically, with sometimes very long periods of wellness in-between 
episodes, the myth of “Once mad, always mad” persists (Johnson 468). If successful in our 
efforts to represent ourselves as people who experience mental disability, Speakers Bureau 
members then face that possibility that audience members will doubt the accuracy of our careful 
attempts to represent the vicissitudes of our conditions through speech.  
For example, autistic rhetorician, Melanie Yergeau, writes about the frustration of having 
non-autistic scholars conclude that autistic people cannot understand or accurately represent their 
own thinking. She explains, “[A]utistic people exemplify inherent unreliability. Whether in 
published autobiographies or in the blogosphere, autistic narratives are regarded as questionable 
(un)truths” (14). Kerschbaum also attests to the potential loss of credibility that can accompany a 
disclosure of disability (in her case, deafness) when she notes: “[I]t is only when I find my 
interlocutors willing to respond to me and take seriously my version of things that I can speak to 
them” (68) (emphasis added). As the discussion of Ruth and Phil’s presentations will show, a 
speaker can take steps to bolster this damaged credibility or simply count on the audience to take 
her seriously. 
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Of course, not all disclosures of disability, even those of mental disability, signal a 
damaged ethos to audiences. Peter Wayne Moe examines a speech given by actor, Michael J. 
Fox, to members of Congress. Fox gave the speech while not taking his Parkinson’s medications 
and so “performed” his neurological disability for the audience. Moe argues that Fox’s visible, 
physical symptoms helped to establish his ethos as a representative of people with Parkinson’s 
disease. By putting his body on display, he got the audience to consider which of his personas 
should be considered the “normal” one, a level of message control deeper than that usually 
afforded to disabled people and one Moe attributes to the credibility Fox gained as a speaker 
inhabiting the physical effects of his disability (355).  
It is also possible that being the people who live the realities students have been studying 
in their psychology classes may grant Speakers Bureau members extra credibility rather than 
decreasing it. As Gloria puts it: “We’re in a unique position. Only we can teach it from our 
angle. I mean, it’s one thing for a teacher to get up there and say, ‘This is what mental illness is.’ 
This is us saying who we are .  .  . taking control of the message we send about ourselves. I think 
a lot of teachers might teach it as ‘these poor people’ or ‘these horrific enigmas’ you know, to 
society. But we’re putting a face on it. We’re saying, ‘No, this is who we are. We are just like 
you, or we’re not much different from you.’” In noting that speakers take control of the message 
we send about ourselves, Gloria assumes a credible speaker ethos that will guarantee the positive 
reception of that message.  
Ruth’s Rhetoric—Seeking “connection” Through Deep Disclosure 
During one of Ruth’s presentations, a student asks if people ever imply that she is 
“stupid,” referring angrily to the “Why doesn’t she just eat?” comments he hears about an 
anorexic friend. When she responds by commiserating with the student’s frustration at such 
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unsympathetic remarks, Ruth illustrates an internalized sense of the damaged ethos that can 
accompany disclosures of mental disability. She expresses her frustration at not being believed: 
“People don’t .  .  . If they have never experienced it, they don’t get the legitimacy part of it.” 
Her entire presentation, with its detailed description of the thoughts, emotions, and behaviors that 
accompany her disability, clearly seeks to establish the legitimacy of bipolar mood disorder. 
Describing others’ responses to her experience of not being able to get out of bed when she was 
depressed, Ruth explains: “Cause it looks like you have a choice. It looks to people like you are 
being lazy. And people will say ‘Why don’t you just go back to work?’ or ‘Why don’t you go for 
a walk? Why don’t you get a dog?’ You know? ‘Why don’t you go to funny movies?’”  
In her analysis of a transcript of her speech, Ruth circles this section and writes: “I say 
this to fight stigma about mental illness, the unfairness of not being understood. I feel angry 
when I say this, resentful. I think the audience sees how this has happened to them, how they’ve 
been the person in desperate trouble or the person not accepting someone else’s truth.” The key 
phrase here is “not accepting someone else’s truth.” Ruth comes to her speaking engagements 
with this bitter experience of not being considered credible when she tries to tell others about her 
experience of mental disability.  
In the classroom, Ruth offers the audience deep disclosure about her experiences with 
mental disability. Ruth’s description of being suicidal is one example of the rhetorical invitation 
that group leader, Gloria, encourages speakers to provide: 
When I’ve been suicidal, when I was most dangerous to myself, I wasn’t emotional, I 
wasn’t ‘Oh I want to die!’ I was very calm. I was in a problem-solving mode . . . just 
kind of like—what comes to mind is you know you’re going to have a test on Friday, 
and yeah, you make a plan. You’re either gonna wait ‘til the last possible minute, or 
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you’re gonna do a little bit each day to get ready for the test. Well, I was in this do a 
little bit every day to get ready for the test kind of plan. When you’re suicidal, they 
always ask, ‘Have you thought about how you’d do it?’ Well, I thought about how I 
would do it. Then they ask, ‘Do you have the means to do it? Do you have the gun?’ 
And I had the means to do it.  
By providing vivid and detailed description of her internal thought process during her time of 
depression, Ruth tries to make the audience a part of that process. Her rhetoric seeks to invite 
them in, especially through the surprising analogy between preparing for a test, something any 
student can imagine, and preparing to commit suicide.  She offers play-by-play details in an 
attempt to give the listener necessary proof that she has experienced depression and that 
depression is something real.  
Ruth’s experiences with disclosure about the nature of her disability have shown her the 
risk inherent in this move. She chooses to deal with the ever-present vulnerability to a damaged 
ethos by leaning into that vulnerability. She does this by insisting on speaking extemporaneously 
during each classroom presentation, unlike some other speakers, who carry notes or talk 
primarily from a memorized script. Asked about this rhetorical choice, she explains that speaking 
off the cuff allows her to be “present” in the room, a term that translates to “vulnerable” as she 
describes why she avoids “canned” speeches: 
It is tempting. I can see why people do it .  .  . If I did it, my feelings would be less. I 
wouldn’t be feeling my feelings while I was giving it if I was doing it the same way 
every time. And why is that?  Because then it would be just like something .  .  . It 
would feel to me that it was just something that I read, that I read in a book, and I’m 
telling them what I read, instead of, like when I do it, I can recall. I can recall how 
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bad it was or what it felt like to suddenly have it lift and all that. And I think that 
might be why.  It’s just being genuine. I’d rather. 
Being genuine or authentic, according to Ruth, involves feeling the emotions associated with 
what one is narrating, i.e., making oneself emotionally vulnerable in the act of speaking, 
vulnerable to re-living the experience being narrated. In an interview, she suggested that feeling 
the emotion of what one recounts, at the moment of recounting it, gives one’s words greater 
connection to the reality they describe and thus a greater ability to reach, or persuade, the 
audience.   
In this way, Ruth does not put up any rhetorical barriers between the way she narrates her 
experience and herself as a person. She does not make attempts to shore up the credibility that 
her clear depiction of herself as mentally disabled might damage. Instead, she deals with the 
vulnerability inherent in deep disclosure by embracing it in the hope that doing so will get 
students to, to use her word, “connect” with her as a human being. She seeks the trust of the 
audience by portraying herself as extremely honest. With a laugh she asks, “What’s the point of 
leaving anything out?” Ruth’s reliance on the audience’s willingness to accept her level of 
disclosure without the provision of any rhetorical means of bolstering her credibility does leave 
her open to the possibility that some members of that audience will reject her self-representation.  
Some could side instead with the cultural stereotypes that suggest depressed people are “fakers,” 
the very notion Ruth has spent time trying to debunk.  
Phil’s Rhetoric-Seeking “Understanding” Through Holding Back 
Only part of Phil’s presentation consists of what I am calling deep disclosure. Unlike 
Ruth, he does attempt to navigate the tension between the need for deep disclosure and the need 
to be found credible as a speaker. He does this to achieve a goal he mentions in his interview and 
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his rhetorical self-analysis—getting the students in the audience to “understand” mental 
disability. In other words, he wants audiences to know how mental disability works. In the first 
part of his presentation, he gets around the audience’s potential expectation that he is 
disconnected from reality by aligning himself with medical science, an entity considered highly 
credible by the general public when it comes to discussions of mental disability, even as strong 
opposition to the workings of the psychiatric establishment exists (Price 10-12, 33-37). The 
beginning section of Phil’s speech contains no direct description of the emotions related to his 
experience of paranoid schizophrenia.  Rather, it centers on the medical model of mental 
disability and details the biological origins and treatment of what he presents as brain diseases. 
He offers information about the origin, workings, and treatment of his own disability, stressing 
that mental disability has a biological origin, that schizophrenia results from low dopamine 
levels, and that his schizophrenia has been effectively treated with a particular medication.  
Through this linkage to the language of psychiatry, Phil portrays himself as a person 
living a reality that science clearly understands. The contention that science can explain mental 
disability carries with it the somewhat comforting sense that things are under control, that there 
are answers. By presenting his reality within the context of science, Phil attempts to present that 
reality as valid, explicable, and therefore acceptable. In this part of his speech he distances 
himself from deep disclosure, presenting mental disability as a monolithic, comprehensible entity 
rather than an individual experience. 
The fact-based, unemotional rhetoric Phil uses in the beginning of his speech implies 
internalized knowledge of the public perception of schizophrenic people as irrational and 
incoherent. Beyond the desire to inform, I believe his reliance on psychiatric explanation, 
presented in a teacherlike fashion, reflects a desire to combat possible negative perceptions about 
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how a schizophrenic person speaks and behaves. In response to the interview question, “Do you 
think the Speakers Bureau speeches affect the stigma that surrounds mental disability in any 
way?” Phil responds: “By giving students an understanding of what mental illness is about. I 
would also hope that they would have a clinical view of mental illness. Asked “Why a clinical 
view?” he responds that he seeks to impart “.  .  . almost a scientific view and a medical view.  If 
they [have] that, I think they’ll be more fair to those that have mental illness.” Phil’s clear, 
unequivocal style of presentation contradicts any unfair expectations an audience may have of 
encountering the “word salad” or “verbal diarrhea” attributed to speakers with schizophrenia 
(Walters 86). By structuring his speech in the logical fashion listeners expect from rational 
speakers, he seeks to give his words transactional worth. Presented through the persona of 
scientific “expert,” his rhetoric initially seeks to get the audience to understand and accept Phil’s 
conception of how mental disability works. 
As his speech progresses, Phil does move from a scientific discussion of mental disability 
into a description of his own experience with paranoid schizophrenia. In the following passage, 
he discloses details many people would find highly embarrassing to reveal:  
Delusions are one of the symptoms of schizophrenia. You may ask “What’s a delusion?” 
If I say a delusion I have .  .  . The delusion says, ‘They’re monitoring everything you 
think, do, and say.’ Well what am I supposed to do with that? What I do is, I put it in a 
box. It’s a therapeutic device. It’s when I can’t figure out the delusion. Sometimes 
someone may have a delusion about a satellite beaming down on you and monitoring 
your brain . . . If I don’t want to think about it anymore, I put it in a box. 
By being willing to disclose these potentially embarrassing details, Phil presents his experiences 
as credible representations of mental disability.  He offers the audience further engaging 
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description when he describes his experience with hallucinations of various types: “Sometimes I 
tell myself everything I see is a hallucination. But what do you do about that if you think you 
have a hallucination? I always tell my symptoms, I say, ‘I want to see what is there. I want to 
hear what is there. I don’t want to have a hallucination!’” Here he speaks about his symptoms as 
entities outside of himself, as things he can fight by “telling” them he does not want to 
experience them. He rhetorically reaches out to the audience to get them to take on his quandary, 
asking “What am I supposed to do with that?” about delusions and “What do you do about that?” 
regarding hallucinations. Although deep disclosure does not constitute his entire presentation, as 
it does Ruth’s, Phil does use it in instances such as these. In doing so, he takes the chance that 
students in the audience will reject him as corresponding too closely to stereotypes of 
schizophrenic people that correlate the presence of delusions and hallucinations with danger to 
others. This despite his careful attempts to construct his ethos on the basis of the science 
surrounding mental disability.  
The possibility of rejection by the audience is one that Speakers Bureau members 
constantly face as part of the act of representing our realities to the students we address. What 
drives us, I believe, in the hope that some of these students will respond to our disclosures with a 
corresponding vulnerability or openness. We hope they will grant us the credibility we require to 
give our self-representations the power to persuade. 
Deep Disclosure and Audience Vulnerability 
 In providing deep disclosure, Speakers Bureau rhetors create vulnerabilities not just for 
ourselves but for our audiences as well. Some of these vulnerabilities involve exposure and can 
be experienced as threatening. They must be considered in any attempt to assess the value of 
deep disclosure. But some can be experienced by audience members as openings leading to 
72 
 
 
 
positive rhetorical outcomes such as a greater connection with oneself and between self and 
other. The possibility of such outcomes indicates the value of accepting the risk to speaker ethos 
that deep disclosure necessitates.  In his meditation on vulnerability and rhetoric, Richard 
Marback makes a useful comparison between empathy and vulnerability as they apply to 
audiences for another’s rhetoric. Empathy involves an openness to the influence of the other but 
includes the possibility of controlling one’s response so as not to risk one’s own integrity. 
Vulnerability, however, involves greater risk, a risk to our sense of self, i.e. our integrity, or our 
own views. As Marback puts it: “To be vulnerable is to be exposed to forces beyond our control, 
forces that have the potential to disrupt who we are” (6-7). He does not consider vulnerability a 
necessarily negative thing, however, pointing out that certain vulnerabilities that involve positive 
actions can be considered “expressions of integrity” (7). The Speakers Bureau student audiences 
may find themselves made vulnerable by the deep disclosures of the person at the front of the 
room and this vulnerability can take either a threatening or an inviting form, depending on the 
ways in which the listeners respond to what they are hearing. Some of those responses may be 
automatic and others may depend on listener choice. 
Trauma is one potential, automatic response that can affect students if they themselves 
have experience with a mental disability or know friends or family members who do. Hearing 
about the difficult experiences of people with the same conditions as they have or know of in 
loved ones can cause fear and hopelessness in listeners despite the Speakers Bureau’s charge to 
present our stories in an ultimately hopeful light. Fear may also result from getting the 
information that many mental disabilities strike people in their teens and early twenties, a point 
that Phil stresses in the information portion of his presentations. In her discussion of “trigger 
warnings,” instructor statements to students that some course materials might generate negative 
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emotions and even traumatic flashbacks, Alison Kafer refers specifically to the effects of 
disability disclosure in the classroom. She notes that these disclosures “often will involve 
histories of trauma.” “Given such histories,” she asks, “what are the effects on, and what are our 
obligations to, the people we disclose to in our classrooms, our conference rooms, our 
conversations” (4)? At a training for potential new speakers, Gloria stressed the importance of 
caution when considering what kinds of details to disclose to impressionable, young minds.  
Seeing seemingly rational people talking about their experiences with mental disability 
may also provide a challenge to audience members’ senses of self. If they perceive themselves as 
“normal,” the speaker presentations might threaten the inviolate nature of that perception. For 
students without mental disabilities, choosing to draw closer to the often-disturbing details of a 
speaker’s experience requires them to adopt a vulnerable stance in the rhetorical situation. 
Accepting the visibly rational speakers’ narrated realities means students have to acknowledge 
that mental disability might affect them someday. As Sander Gilman describes it:  
The banality of real mental illness comes into conflict with our need to have the 
mad be identifiable, different from ourselves. Our shock is always that they are 
really just like us. This moment, when we say, ‘they are really just like us’ is most 
upsetting. Then we no longer know where lies the line that divides our normal, 
reliable world, a world that minimizes our fears, from that world in which lurks 
the fearful, the terrifying, the aggressive. We want—no, we need—the ‘mad’ to 
be different . . . (13) 
Madeline Burghardt also notes this potential source of vulnerability for the students by 
referencing M. Shildrick’s contention that “the vulnerability evoked when in close contact with 
disability is threatening, not because of profound difference, but rather because of proximity” 
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(560). In other words, attempting to understand the experiences of the speakers requires many of 
the students in the audience to admit to similarities between themselves and the people they 
might prefer to think of as a comfortably distanced “them.” 
 The potential for vulnerability that audiences experience as inviting also exists each time 
a Speakers Bureau member makes a presentation. It is true that faced with deep disclosure about 
another person’s mental health struggles, audience members can choose to move away, 
symbolically, by considering the disclosed details further support for stigma: “See, this person is 
very strange and truly has nothing in common with me as a human being!” Bureau members run 
this risk every time we narrate our non-normative experiences. As Kerschbaum explains, 
disability disclosures are not one-way streets. The audience for the disclosure must accept the 
rhetor’s constructed disability identity for the disclosure to succeed (62). The audience has this 
power in the rhetorical situation.  
But audiences have another choice. They can make themselves vulnerable to the 
influence of the mentally disabled speaker in a welcoming way, risking their sense of self by 
opening themselves up to the possibility of broadening that sense. If an audience member allows 
the speaker to move towards him or herself through deep disclosure, that person makes possible 
a challenge to the integrity of something he or she holds dear. What the Bureau members’ 
intimate revelations challenge, I suggest, is the neurotypical students’ faith in the idea of 
normalcy. To maintain her sense of self, a student approaching the speakers’ revelations with 
good intentions would need to expand her idea of what it means to be human. She would have to 
accept people who experience strange emotions, thoughts, and behaviors into the fold of what it 
means to be “us.” The audience member can respond to the Speakers Bureau member’s 
willingness to make themselves vulnerable through deep disclosure by moving towards that 
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speaker in terms of a new perception of mental disability as, for lack of a better term, a natural 
part of human experience. 
Agency Through Vulnerability 
“If people think you’re crazy, they don’t listen to you.” Speakers Bureau members openly 
disclose, to varying degrees, the details of our madness and intend that people will listen to us. 
Not only that they will listen to us but that they will accept our message of inclusion. In order to 
show ourselves as credibly mentally disabled, members of the Speakers Bureau make ourselves 
vulnerable through deep disclosure. The vulnerability thus created—vulnerability to the charge 
that as mentally disabled people we are not capable of accurate self-representation—is worth the 
risk. Through that same deep disclosure, we give our audiences the opportunity to respond to us 
with a productive vulnerability of their own.  By making ourselves vulnerable to our student 
audiences in rhetorical situations that encourage them to also make themselves vulnerable, the 
Speakers Bureau participates in scenes with the potential for rhetorical agency.  
Carolyn Miller calls on us to consider rhetorical agency a “kinetic energy,” one that is 
owned neither by the speaker or the audience but by the speaking (or writing) event (147). For 
my purposes, the most important part of Miller’s discussion is her argument that this kinetic 
energy between speaker and audience can only exist if both the speaker and the audience 
members attribute agency to each other (150). As she explains, “Rather than having to having to 
posit an agent function existing in a totally abstract space, we can position it within the habitual 
or imposed patterns of attributions that rhetor or audience is prepared to make. The agent 
function, then, would be simply an indication of the ability or willingness of participants to 
attribute a particular form of agency” (Miller 151). In the classrooms where Speakers Bureau 
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members appear, the assumption of rhetorical positions of vulnerability plays a role in these 
attributions of agency.  
By assuming the vulnerable rhetorical stance that comes with the provision of deep 
disclosure, members of the Speakers Bureau grant to the students in our audiences the power to 
reject the life narrations put before them. They can hear our deep disclosures and choose to find 
us repulsive. We hope, however, that the detailed descriptions we offer will instead make it 
enticing for audience members to draw closer to the realities being described. And by assuming a 
vulnerable rhetorical stance, the audience members, in turn, grant to the speakers the power to 
affect the audience’s perceptions of people with mental disabilities either positively or 
negatively.  By granting the speakers credibility, they make themselves open to the construction 
of identities that might seem disturbing, especially when that openness includes the 
acknowledgement of the fact that mental disability can touch their own lives in some fashion. 
They open themselves up to believing in the existence and acceptability of realities they cannot 
completely understand. In the context of the Speakers Bureau’s attempts to fight stigma through 
narratives of self-disclosure, the speaker and the audience member’s willingness to take a 
vulnerable stance—to grant potentially change-producing agency to the other—can be seen as 
something necessary to rhetorical success. 
The success of a given speaker’s classroom presentation depends, I believe, on the extent 
to which we are willing to deeply disclose potentially embarrassing details about our 
experiences, making ourselves vulnerable to the audience members’ judgement. How close are 
we willing to move towards the audience’s ability to embrace or reject us? Ruth is willing to 
move very close, Phil less so. A highly vulnerable stance on the speaker’s part may open up the 
possibility that at least some audience members will respond with a corresponding act of 
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vulnerability. Responding to the speaker’s openness, some students might find themselves 
willing to try to imagine experiencing the thoughts, emotions, and behaviors depicted through 
speech. In this way, the students may attribute to the speaker the capacity to change their 
perceptions about mental disability. Moving closer through the act of attempting to understand at 
least something of the speaker’s described reality could help the audience to see Speakers Bureau 
members as part of “us” rather than as part of “them.” In the classroom, an agentive rhetorical 
effect might be achieved, not through the actions of one person or group but through the 
interaction of elements, what Marilyn Cooper calls the “dance of perturbation and response as 
agents interact” (qtd. in Kerschbaum   64).  When Speakers Bureau members speak through the 
vulnerable stance that makes our individual realities more palpable to people who, for the most 
part, do not know them, we open up possibilities for a commensurate and co-occurring “return of 
serve”—the acceptance of life truths that need to be heeded in order for the public to better 
recognize all of its citizens.  
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CHAPTER 4 CONSIDERING DISCLOSURE IN ONE’S OWN CLASSROOM 
As described in Chapter Three, members of the Speakers Bureau rely on the rhetorical 
tactic of deep disclosure to move the stigma-fighting effort forward. We make ourselves and our 
audience members vulnerable in the hope that this vulnerability will prove productive, drawing 
both speaker and listener closer to the other in understanding. In this chapter, I move away from 
the Speakers Bureau, undoing what I did in previous chapters by introducing and interrogating a 
situation in which the vulnerability engendered by deep disclosure may not have productive 
results. I do so to argue that the context of deep disclosure matters and to explore how it matters. 
I make the claim that it is possible, in some contexts, to fight stigma without engaging in public 
disclosure of one’s mental disability. 
Deep disclosure in the Speakers Bureau context comes with risks that each speaker 
accepts—the risks of being considered incompetent, not credible, and simply not fully human. 
But there is safety as well in the relative anonymity of this organization’s work. Because we do 
not have an ongoing relationship with the young people we address, their influence on our lives 
is limited. When we enter high school and college psychology classrooms, we do not have an 
identity outside of “the mentally ill person who is here to talk about what living with mental 
illness is like.” Even when we reveal other aspects of our identities to encourage the students to 
think of us as complete human beings, the students continue to exist for us as pure audience. We 
enter their classrooms as strangers, disclose troubling aspects of our lives to try to persuade them 
not to stigmatize people with mental disabilities, and leave as strangers. Interaction ends there. 
In other contexts, such as employment situations, members of the Speakers Bureau are 
not strangers and thus do have to consider the possible risks inherent in disability disclosure. For 
example, when I enter my own undergraduate writing classrooms, I have the identity of 
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“teacher,” one that my students become familiar with as the semester progresses. As a writing 
teacher, I choose not to make even a limited disclosure of my mental disability to students. While 
deep disclosure serves my stigma-fighting goal as a Speakers Bureau member, I keep the 
mentally disabled aspect of my identity separate from my overt teacher identity. I see the latter as 
composed of a set of functions I perform in and outside the classroom. As long as my state of 
mental health allows me to perform those functions well, I see no reason to risk having my 
workplace competence called into question by a psychiatric diagnosis. A few semesters ago, a 
classroom incident that stigmatized mental disability challenged this decision to keep my 
condition hidden. The incident left me both eager to let students see my “mark” and frightened of 
doing so. This chapter explores ways in which instances of ableism in the classroom are fraught 
for mentally disabled teachers. In it, I ask which positionality—mentally disabled person or 
neutral instructor—might better serve a teacher’s goal of addressing such ableist incidents 
productively.  
In what follows, I describe what took place in the classroom that day and interrogate the 
pedagogical implications of my immediate reaction—the overwhelming desire to disclose my 
bipolar mood disorder. I explore what is at stake for mentally disabled teachers and students 
when the realities of mental disability stigma and pedagogy intersect. I examine how such 
teachers can get students to engage the issue of mental disability when it arises in the classroom, 
engage it in a way that involves accepting the idea of mental difference rather than rejecting it.  
By asking “What could I have done?” about the stigmatizing incident, I seek to contribute to the 
ongoing discussion about the advisability and potential of teacher disclosures of mental 
disability. As in the previous three chapters, I continue to use the term “mental disability” to 
refer to what psychiatry refers to as “mental illness.” I use the former term in keeping with the 
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disability studies contention that psychiatrically diagnosed conditions, while impairing, are not 
medical defects. 
Like the mostly high school aged students the Speakers Bureau addresses, college 
students are young enough to be still forming their attitudes towards people with mental 
disabilities. Thus, responding pedagogically to instances of mental disability stigma in the 
classroom matters. As Caroline Mann and Melissa Himelein observe about typically popular 
college psychology classes:  
There are few places in society where we have access to such a wide and captive     
audience, where a non-intrusive stigma intervention could be implemented with 
little extra effort or cost. To wait and attempt to reach these young adults after 
their attitudes have solidified and they have scattered throughout the workforce 
would be a major undertaking, with diminishing chances of success. (549) 
The stigmatizing incident in my classroom, which I describe below, involved a highly diverse set 
of students. They were united, however, in amusement at one student’s comment about bipolar 
mood disorder. My questions about how a mentally disabled teacher might respond to such 
ableist incidents have everything to do with Mann and Himelein’s description of the classroom 
as a “captive audience.” I seek to understand how to make the most productive use of this 
captivity in which teachers play a significant role. 
Frozen by Laughter 
Like any instructor, I build a classroom persona as each semester of teaching progresses. 
Part of the construction of my persona involves decisions about what details to reveal to students. 
A few semesters ago, I found myself teaching an ambitious, enthusiastic, intelligent group of 
young adults in a service learning class our university calls Writing and Community. Based on 
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the urban justice issues discussed in class, it made sense, at one point in the semester, to tell the 
students about my background as a housing/homelessness activist. I enjoyed their amused 
reactions to my revelation that I had been arrested “not once, not twice, but three times!” for civil 
disobedience. I felt comfortable making this disclosure because my “criminal record” is a matter 
of pride for me rather than a matter of shame. 
What I chose not to disclose to that class was the mental disability aspect of my identity. 
While unashamed of my condition, I nonetheless feared the public shaming, the stigma, that can 
attend its disclosure. I did not want my students to consider me dangerous, irrational, or 
incapable of performing my duties in any way: “She’s crazy, and she’s grading our papers?!” If I 
am honest, I can say I chose to enjoy the privileged position of relative respect and human 
dignity that “passing” as neurotypical allowed me in the classroom (Wolframe 3). 
Despite my regular participation in the activities of the Speakers Bureau, I was 
completely unprepared for the day the topic of mental disability arose in my own classroom. I 
had just finished describing a colleague who experimentally alternated teacher personas from 
semester to semester. One semester, he would approach his class in a very friendly fashion. The 
next semester, he would come in with a much tougher stance. Hearing this, a student, Avi, 
responded with “Sounds like he’s got bipolar mood disorder!” The entire class burst out 
laughing. Mortified, I desperately wanted to say something to counter the swirling derision. 
Instead, I found myself frozen and smiling along. I felt outnumbered and powerless in the face of 
their obvious amusement at the thought of my disability. Their reaction and its seeming 
universality stripped me of my rhetorical agency. I did not feel capable of saying anything that 
would affect the situation. At that moment, I did not have rhetoric that would transform the 
derision into respect or at least empathy. 
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Here was an opportune moment to address stigma, it seemed, if I could just harness its 
potential in the right pedagogical way. I forced down my immediate impulse—to give the class 
pause by coming out the them about my own disability. I wanted to beat back the stigma but 
found my tools limited. All I felt I had was disclosure—the ability to say, “Hey, please don’t 
laugh. I have a bipolar mood disorder, and it’s not something to laugh about!” This would have 
silenced the class, certainly, and would have shamed Avi. But these were not my goals. I wanted 
to permanently end the stigma so clearly on display. Standing in front of the class as they 
laughed, I found my mind a blank. I also encountered a sense of shame, knowing I was letting 
my sisters and brothers in mental disability down by smiling along at bipolar mood disorder 
posited as a joke. 
Despite the overwhelming desire to disclose, I froze in class that day due to the emotions 
and potential consequences the very thought of such an action brought to the fore. Listening to 
the students’ laughter, I felt extremely vulnerable and let that sensation keep me silent. I did not 
feel comfortable leaning into my vulnerability in the way I describe Ruth doing through deep 
disclosure in Chapter Three. I did not feel ready to embody the subject of the students’ laughter. 
In the classrooms Speakers Bureau members enter, stigma exists as a potential. We know the 
students live in a culture saturated with images that denigrate us, but we do not usually encounter 
direct instances of stigma. In contrast, Avi brought stigma into the writing classroom that day in 
a concrete way. Rhetorically, this intrusion required me to “think on my feet” as a rhetor rather 
than presenting prepared material the way I was used to doing as part of the Bureau. I found 
myself unable to do so.   
As noted, members of the Speakers Bureau risk rejection by people they most likely will 
never encounter again. If I revealed my mental disability to my class in response to Avi’s 
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comment, I risked rejection by people with whom I had an ongoing, working relationship. 
Disclosure could strip me of the respect and concurrent authority I believed I needed to carry out 
the functions of my job.  
My newfound sense of vulnerability created a problem in the classroom because it stood 
in the way of my belief, as a teacher, that I needed to make use of the teaching moment the 
stigmatizing comment had created. As an anti-stigma advocate, I heard an equally strong inner 
voice saying, “Do something!” Among my students, there must have been at least a few, if not 
more, who had experience with mental disability or knew people who did. They, at the very 
least, could have used a discussion of mental disability that did not involve mockery. Despite 
feeling vulnerable, I knew it was my duty as a teacher committed to socially relevant education 
to decide how to proceed. 
What I Had to Lose 
One emotion silenced me in the classroom that day—fear. I felt fear at the thought of 
disclosing a highly-stigmatized aspect of my identity. I did not want to begin wondering what 22 
sets of eyes might now see as they looked at me. It believed it important for my ethos that my 
students see me as capable, a quality that culturally circulating stereotypes of mental disability 
negate. As the teacher, I was used to having significant credibility in the classroom setting. 
Disclosure of mental disability could eradicate that ethos. Worse still, it could leave me with the 
kakoethos, or “bad state” Johnson describes in her discussion of Senator Terry Eagleton (462). In 
a class focused on rhetoric, a teacher with kakoethos would be open to insinuations about her 
ability to pass unaffected judgment on student writing and student performance in general. 
Standing in front of my laughing students, I did not relish revealing my position as someone 
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whose rationality would be brought into question by kakoethos, not when rationality is the 
unspoken “minimum qualification” of the instructor’s job.  
I know that the symptoms of a mental disability such as mine only occur episodically, 
that to be “mentally ill” does not mean that one is experiencing symptoms at all times. Only 
during an “episode,” to use psychiatric parlance, is lack of rationality even an issue. But my 
students, steeped in cultural stigma as I assumed them to be, may not hold this view. They may 
see the situation as “Once mentally disabled, always mentally disabled.”  I found myself 
wondering if disclosure would make my students scrutinize my every move, especially because 
bipolar mood disorder remains a highly-stigmatized disorder as compared to, for example, 
depression. The wild “highs” the public associates with the former disability make it easier to 
mock. I have a hard time imagining a classroom laughing at the mention of depression as a 
condition on its own. 
 I feared losing authority if my students knew I had a disability that from time to time 
could affect my ability to think, feel, and behave rationally. I wanted to maintain my authority to 
set the parameters of a class, to keep discussion moving along, to evaluate student work, etc. 
These endeavors require that students have faith that you, the teacher, know what you are doing 
and are capable of doing it. In a way, the expectation of pervasive teacher authority is an ableist 
paradigm, one that does not account for instructors who may not always be able to meet the 
standard. For example, students expect their teachers to have their thoughts, emotions, and 
behaviors under control at all times. The possibility of my students losing faith in my ability to 
perform in the expected way was terrifying. While the institution grants the teacher her authority, 
the doubt of students can take it away. 
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When I thought later about my students laughing at the mention of bipolar mood 
disorder, I wished I could, through disclosure, get them to put aside their clear stigmatization of 
people with mental disabilities and replace it with the gifts they had in their power, as an 
audience, to bestow on me—the attributions of respect and dignity that all stigmatized people 
seek. In saying this, I clearly give all the power in the rhetorical situation to my students. This is 
what stigma can feel like. Fighting it verbally can involve a stance of supplication, at least when 
using the narrative disclosure tactics of the Speakers Bureau: “Please return us our dignity as 
fellow human beings!” Standing frozen at the front of the class, however, I felt distinctly 
vulnerable to the possibility that I might speak out, might tell a story that “put my face on mental 
illness,” and still not receive the respect I craved for the newly revealed aspect of my identity. 
During a later discussion of my dilemma, a colleague asked bluntly, “Why disclose?” I 
responded that to do so would be to seize a potentially powerful teaching moment, one which 
would give my students an opportunity to engage directly with a stigmatized “other.” Identifying 
myself as that “other” could have opened the chance for me to de-stigmatize not just my own 
mental disability but such disabilities in general.  Eager to enact that kind of a perceptual shift 
whenever and wherever possible, I came away from the incident wondering how I could respond 
to a similar incident of stigma: What kind of commentary, what rhetoric, could have turned the 
laughter into a transformative discussion of mental disability? This question has broader 
implications for other mentally disabled teachers who grapple with the issue of disability 
disclosure in the classroom. My scholarship is a small attempt to add to this discussion, with the 
understanding that the pedagogical fight against stigma can, student by student, lead to a more 
progressive and inclusive citizenry. 
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An Initial Pedagogical Response 
 After the incident mentioned above, I set to work coming up with a proper pedagogical 
response—an answer to “What should I have done so as not to lose a powerful teaching 
moment?” I made a one-day lesson plan because I knew I could not spare more time for the 
stigma issue in a tightly scheduled, service learning focused writing class. The Speakers 
Bureau’s method of fighting stigma through narrative disclosure drove my thoughts, as did my 
belief that any classroom intervention would have to involve significant student discussion of the 
stigma that attends psychiatric diagnoses. As disabled college instructor, Deshae E. Lott, 
observes: “Although on one level student silence regarding another’s disability may suggest an 
embracing of the Other, on another level I know that to truly embrace alternatives and 
differences requires carefully considering them and grappling with the interplay of embedded 
cultural constraints” (149). Like Lott, I wanted my students to struggle, to think about and write 
about what influences in their lives led them to the perception of mental disability that made 
them burst out laughing at the very mention of it. Like Lott, I wanted to encourage students to 
examine why the “other” has been excluded in the community and seek out ways to change that 
exclusion (151). What follows is my initial thinking and lesson plan for a class session in which I 
would “set things right.”: 
“After reflection, I believe an instructor can destigmatize mental disability in the 
classroom by laying herself open to the very vulnerabilities an initial disability disclosure would 
bring to the fore. By risking through disclosure what there is to lose—specifically, classroom 
authority and the pose of overriding rationality—an instructor with a mental disability can 
create the chance to win a small victory for herself and her mentally disabled compatriots as 
well as offering at least some of her students the benefits of a broadened definition of “us.”  
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As a start, on the day in question, I could have leaned into my sense of being vulnerable 
to a loss of classroom authority by accepting, if not even welcoming, that loss. First, I would 
have to make my disclosure immediately after the laughter died down. With the benefit of 
hindsight, I imagine saying something like the following: ‘This is hard to talk about, but I need to 
say something because I really like this class, and I respect you as people. I need to say that 
because these things are true, it troubles me to hear you laughing at the idea of bipolar disorder. 
It troubles me because I have that condition. I belong to a group of people that goes around to 
local schools and colleges talking about our experiences with mental disability. We do this to 
fight the stigma that exists around these conditions. Now I’m faced with an example of that 
stigma right here in our class, and I’d like us to talk about mental disability for a bit—not to 
embarrass you for making a comment or for having laughed at it but to see if we can figure out 
this stigma thing together. I’ve been impressed with the way you guys have discussed other 
social issues, so I’d like us to tackle this one, to see where we can get in our understanding of it. 
And right up front, I want you to know that I won’t be judging you based on anything you say. 
That’s just something you’ll have to take my word for! So please feel free to be honest in your 
comments during the discussion I would like us to have.’ 
Next, I would ask students to write for a while about their connection to the issue of 
mental disability. I would do this knowing that it would be likely that some students may have a 
mentally disabled friend of family member or may be struggling with such an issue themselves. 
Although my disclosure may make them feel comfortable to do so, I would not expect or even 
encourage anyone to “come out.” Rather, I would ask people write about the sources of their 
perceptions of mental disability including any media sources they cared to name. By using 
writing as a starting point, I would hope to help students lessen the natural vulnerability they 
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might feel addressing such a topic—one that is socially stigmatized and one to which their 
instructor has a strong, personal connection. Next, I would ask those students who felt 
comfortable doing so to share their writing, to which the rest of the class could respond.  
The key here is that my narrative would be just one of several possible ones, rather than 
being the focal point of attention. Several members of the class would provide their own link to 
the issue. Ideally, I would save my speaking for last. To achieve true dialogue on such a sensitive 
topic, especially after a pedagogical intervention enacted by the instructor, students would need 
to feel comfortable joining the conversation from whatever standpoint they had at the moment. 
One of the most interesting moments of my experience with the Speakers Bureau came when I 
asked a gathered group of students what they had expected when they heard that people with 
mental disabilities were coming to speak to them. One young man said, “I expected you to be 
drooling and wheeled in in a wheelchair.” This comment was followed by further explanations 
that the images they had of mentally disabled people came from asylum scenes in the movies and 
on television. If some of my students mentioned similar sources for their impressions of mental 
disability, while others might at least know people with such disabilities, I can envision a spirited 
discussion of stigma ensuing. 
 When it came to my time to speak, I would offer the students an abbreviated version of 
the presentation I give in psychology classes, to give them a glimpse of one person’s experience 
with mental disability. Doing this would require me to make myself vulnerable to the fear of 
being judged as irrational based on even brief descriptions of the two poles of my disability—
mania and depression. 
The steps of the lesson plan I propose for use in a classroom where the subject of mental 
disability ‘pops up’ unexpectedly begin with the first act—teacher disclosure. I see the disclosure 
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as useful because it would give students an opportunity to question the “other” and to see a 
“face of mental disability” that does not match stereotypes they may hold. Each step that follows 
—the writing and the unfolding of the ensuing discussion—is based on keeping both the teacher 
and each student open to the vulnerabilities they face as members of a dialogue. The students 
will individually decide whether to embrace those vulnerabilities by entering the discussion in 
certain ways. Their participation is not something the teacher can guarantee or control. All she 
can do is set things in motion through her initial disclosure of a stigmatized identity. It would not 
be the teacher’s job to “win” the affirmation of her audience. In fact, she would cease to view 
the class as an audience at all. Instead, the entire group would make themselves individually 
vulnerable to negative outcomes in the search for a positive, stigma-reducing, positive one. All 
involved would encounter the possibility of transformation. Students might know a 
transformation of previously stigmatizing perceptions of mentally disabled people, and the 
teacher may find herself transformed in the act of listening to her students to learn what they can 
teach her about the origins and workings of stigma.  
Consider that day in the classroom. What if, after my initial disclosure statement, I had 
set up a classroom writing and discussion session as described here? What if I had let go of the 
rhetorical stance of disabuse— “No. You are wrong, and I am going to show you why!”—and 
offered the option of “Let’s approach this topic of mental disability and stigma together to try to 
understand it better”? I would be putting my students in a vulnerable position in that they might 
worry how honest they could be about some of their opinions about mentally disabled people if 
they were negative ones. Some might also be encouraged to risk coming out about their own 
mental disability. Others might experience the discomfort of hearing that mental disability can 
affect anyone and that it often hits people in their early 20’s.  
90 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, I, too, would experience a host of risks. What if the lesson plan met with 
silence despite its best efforts to generate discussion? What if this golden opportunity to fight 
stigma did not pan out, dissolving instead into chaos and washing down the tubes, leaving me 
exposed in front of my class? What if the students did not understand or empathize with mental 
disability, despite my best efforts at inclusive discussion?   I feel comfortable engaging these 
risks for the potential pedagogical and stigma-fighting benefits offered by a lesson based on 
teacher disclosure of disability and the embrace of mutual vulnerabilities in the classroom.  By 
putting the teacher and her students on the same rhetorical footing, a footing dependent on 
vulnerability, such a plan can make truly productive dialogue possible.” 
The lesson plan above represents my earnest desire to react constructively to an instance 
of stigma in my classroom. To interrogate this plan, I turn now to scholarship on both disability 
disclosure in the classroom and the role of teacher identity. The work of some scholars suggests 
that by making personal disclosure the first part of my lesson plan, I could unintentionally lessen 
the chances of enacting a successful stigma-fighting intervention in the classroom. Brenda 
Brueggemann and Debra Moddelmog discuss risks present for the teacher who undertakes 
disclosure of a hidden element of his or her identity. For both authors, the decision to come out 
to their literature classes—Brueggemann as hard of hearing and Moddelmog as lesbian—
involved serious concerns: 
Even our recognition that naming our identities will improve the functioning of 
our classes .  .  .  . is not enough to eliminate our discomfort and worry about how 
the information will be received, processed, and returned. Brenda worries that 
students might read her disability identity with pity or might question her 
intellectual ability or authority because of their perception of missing ‘faculties’; 
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Debra is concerned that students might react to her lesbian identity with vitriolic 
or even violent homophobia. Moreover, the act of naming our invisible and 
supposedly private identities may be taken as an attempt to turn the classroom 
away from knowledge and toward intimacy, which can be troubling for both our 
students and ourselves, since we have been conditioned to see the classroom as 
only an intellectual space. (314-15) 
While I do understand the authors’ worry about bringing what students may consider the 
“private business” of the teacher into the public space of the classroom, I do not see intimate 
revelations and the pursuit of knowledge as necessarily dichotomous undertakings. If I simply 
started talking about my mental disability in class one day, not connecting this disclosure to any 
incident or other topic relevant to the class, I would certainly expect my students to scratch their 
heads. Like Hilary Selznick, I would wonder if my disability disclosure in the classroom might 
leave students feeling I was oversharing (10). Lott’s memory, from her student years, of the 
resentment peers felt towards instructors who seemed to disclose excessively would also give me 
pause. Students viewed such teachers as egotistical and resented being treated as a captive 
audience (143). I would not expect a charge of narcissism from students in the classroom context 
I imagine, however, where I would carefully frame my personal disclosure as the jumping off 
point for helping students explore the concept of mental disability and the stigma that 
accompanies it. I would hope that their recent participation in a stigmatizing classroom incident 
would make the pedagogical need for this exploration clear. True, students may feel like 
“captives” to such a lesson plan, but such a feeling can exist regarding the introduction in the 
classroom of any topic that makes students uncomfortable. This feeling of discomfort when 
faced with a newly disclosed identity, an “other” in the classroom, can be harnessed productively 
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if instructors are open to beginning discussion where students are regarding an uncomfortable 
topic, rather than where we might like them to be.  
My suggested lesson plan does ask for a relatively immediate, high level of student 
comfort with a very difficult topic, a level of comfort and familiarity I now realize I would need 
much longer than one class period to establish. Jonathan Cheu describes a class he taught at Ohio 
State University called “Cultures and Literatures of Disability.” As a visibly disabled teacher, 
(Cheu uses a wheelchair), he was dismayed one day when faced with student silence regarding 
one of the class texts. He observes that students had three reasons for silence concerning 
disability: “not being disabled or not knowing anyone disabled, never having been asked to 
consider disability, and disability being a ‘personal issue’ no one talked about .  .  .  . And, 
because they were not themselves ‘disabled,’ they felt they had no authority to speak, write, or 
say anything about disability. It was the classic “us/them” binary at work” (Bruegemann et. al. 
388). Cheu explains that once he got the students to start talking, their questions were very basic. 
For example, instead of addressing the theory and “hot-button issues” he wanted to discuss, the 
class wanted to know if they should hold the door open for people in wheelchairs.  
Cheu realized that he had to start the classroom discussion from the students’ entry point 
into the issue of disability. He observes, “And although [answering their basic questions] 
perhaps, unwittingly, set me up as some ‘paragon of disability,’ it also, I think, created a 
common vocabulary and validated their experiences and discomfort. It created for us a place to 
speak” (Bruegemann et. al. 389). Cheu’s desire to start discussion at the point of disability theory 
and hot-button issues echoes the intentions of my initial lesson plan. While this plan speaks of 
encouraging students to enter the discussion from “whatever standpoint they [hold] at the 
moment,” it still functions as my plan in that it approaches the topic of mental disability by going 
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straight to the theory I want to talk about—the construction of stigma. It does so without 
accounting for the probability that mental disability, in and of itself, is a topic about which young 
adults might only be beginning to think. They may have questions and concerns much more 
basic than “How does our society construct stigma?” My lesson plan does not take the potential 
for student discomfort with mental disability into account. Just as Cheu finds the careful creation 
of “a place to speak” necessary in the classroom before his students could write with depth and 
passion about disability, I would have to spend many class periods with my students to arrive at a 
place where we could delve comfortably into the topic of mental disability stigma. In a writing 
class not focused on disability, students would probably find themselves at a loss in the face of a 
teacher’s disclosure of mental disability because they would lack the conceptual tools a 
disability-based course would give them to approach the topic with. 
The teachers mentioned above all manage to disclose their disabilities in the classroom 
and conduct engaged classroom discussions about issues related to disability because they teach 
semester-long classes focused on the topic. Getting to a point of comfortable, or uncomfortable 
but functional, classroom discussion about such a fraught issue takes time. As Brueggemann and 
Moddelmog explain: 
In the classroom, we head toward the continual rather than the momentary, 
turning the naming of our identities from a onetime confession into a process 
linked to a theory about identity. From this perspective, our coming out is not so 
much a functional disclosure as a strategic performance. We subsequently situate 
our named identities as claimed identities and explore the relationships, both 
oppressive and enabling, between what has been named (a positioning of identity 
as absolute) and what has been claimed (a positioning of identity as contingent). 
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Thus, the moment of coming out turns into a movement, a bidirectional process of 
communication in which we and our students must do more than simply 
encounter a “secret”: we and they must examine it. That examination is 
sometimes comforting, sometimes discomforting, and sometimes both at once. 
(315) 
A single class period would not give my class enough time to do much more than encounter my 
“secret” briefly. A productive examination of it, one that could eventually get to the issue of 
stigma and its workings, would require sustained focus. A productive examination of mental 
disability could also open the way, as Brueggemann and Moddelmog suggest, for a larger 
classroom discussion of identity. This might help students engage with the concept of otherness, 
something that could forestall future instances of stigma in my classroom and others. 
Besides its limit in scope, my plan also naively assumes that my students and I need to 
somehow achieve equal power in the classroom for them to feel comfortable enough to openly 
discuss their true perceptions about mental disability and mentally disabled people. Such equality 
would be impossible and, I now believe, unnecessary for us to attain. Even though my disclosure 
could have the immediate effect of making students doubt my competence as a teacher, I would 
still possess significant authority in terms of being the one with the power to grade their 
performance as students.  Karen Kopelson cites Cheryl Johnson and Shirley Logan’s experiences 
as teachers marked by difference, noting, “both Logan and Johnson warn that, in a mostly white 
classroom, the mere presence of a woman of color ‘at the front of the room’ often ‘is read as a 
signal that now oral and written expressions of ideas may need to be suppressed lest they offend 
the person who will evaluate them’” (126). At first glance, this warning would seem to put a 
damper on my lesson plan. After all, how effective would my students find assurances that I 
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would not judge them for their views about mental disability when I had just revealed myself as 
mentally disabled and had indicated being upset enough by their show of stigma to make stigma 
the topic of class discussion in the first place?   How willing would they be to air negative 
perceptions shaped by stigma, the very airing necessary to fuel a productive discussion?  
I understand Kopelson’s assessment that the very identity of a teacher with a non-
dominant identity might silence the free expression of students who belong to the dominant 
group. However, I believe she puts too much emphasis on visible elements of identity, such as 
race, when a teacher’s classroom ethos, her students’ trust in her, is something built over time, 
something dependent on elements beyond identity markers.  I build this trust with students 
through our discourse and growing rapport as a semester progresses, through fairness in 
classroom conduct and grading, and through maintaining a sense of humor in the classroom. 
While I cannot in any way guarantee that my students would respond to my suggested lesson 
plan by overcoming the natural fear of offending me, my instinct regarding our nurtured 
relationship as interlocuters suggests that they might do so, especially if I demonstrate my 
openness to questions about my disability in the way that Cheu does about his. 
 Beyond fear, Kopelson also points to resistance as a reason students may not respond 
positively to my attempts to get them to write about and discuss their relationships to mental 
disability, including their connections to stigma. She speaks of the risk run by composition 
teachers whose very identity—as women, as people of color, as gay or lesbian—causes student 
resistance to their attempts to address issues of difference in the classroom (121). The students 
resist such discussions because they view these teachers as too personally invested in the subject 
matter at hand (126). They suspect a political agenda woven into classroom instruction. This 
possibility of student resistance to discussions facilitated by teachers with visible or stated 
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identities that differ from the white, heterosexual, male, able norm has me thinking about the 
resistance my initial lesson plan to combat stigma might encounter because it starts off with my 
disclosure of mental disability. Students may see me as an “other” to resist rather than an “other” 
they want to engage. They may resent being made to discuss a topic in which the teacher has so 
obvious a stake.  
Again though, I feel that Kopelson exaggerates the possibility of such student resistance 
or at least neglects to factor in the relationship of trust an instructor can build in the classroom by 
truly illustrating her respect for all the kinds of students present, including those who may 
initially resist discussing difference. My stake in the topic of mental disability stigma would be 
clear, yes, but students would have had experience in my class with discussing issues in which 
some class members had more of a stake than others. If trust in the teacher’s respect of diverse 
opinions is present, her stake need not loom larger than that of others. Also, the topic at hand, 
mental disability, is one that crosses all other identity lines. People of all races, classes, 
sexualities, genders, abilities, etc. face mental disability or know people who do. This fact might 
motivate class discussion by generating a unified interest in the topic, one that might overcome 
any resistance that might exist. 
Overcoming Student Resistance—The Value of Choosing Not to Disclose 
I developed my one-class lesson plan in the hope of using my personal disclosure of 
mental disability to stimulate lively classroom discussion of how and why people with 
psychiatric diagnoses experience stigma in our culture. Considering the need for a much longer 
period of classroom intervention to adequately address the topic, as well as the possibility that 
disclosure on the teacher’s part might lead students to resist discussion in the ways Kopelson 
suggests, I now believe a disclosure of disability, as part of a one-class lesson, would not 
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adequately serve the purpose of pedagogically taking on the stigma circulating in the classroom 
of a mentally disabled instructor. Nonetheless, I consider finding a way to do so part of my duty 
as an anti-stigma advocate, one whose identity as a teacher affords her unique opportunities to 
reach a key “audience” in the struggle. A teacher’s disclosure of disability might prove intrusive 
and counterproductive to discussion, but what might happen as the result of a classroom 
intervention that did not involve such a disclosure?  
Let us assume the initial lesson plan I proposed would indeed to fail to produce 
productive discussion that would lessen the stigma that swirls around mental disability. What if I, 
or any other mentally disabled teacher, have not developed the level of trust with our students 
that we think we have, and they resist discussion of a fraught topic? Given this possibility, I turn 
to another option for action for mentally disabled teachers who find themselves confronted with 
an instance of stigma in their writing classrooms. Specifically, I seek a way to lessen the 
possibility of resistance to instructor attempts to encourage students to address their own biases.   
Kopelson makes a controversial and intriguing suggestion as to how teachers with clearly 
“different” identities can lessen student resistance to the discussion of such differences in the 
classroom, resistance she believes impedes learning. She argues that teachers who occupy visible 
minority positions in the classroom need to adopt poses of neutrality as instructors, poses that 
emphasize the traditional “teacher in control” dynamic, thus de-emphasizing the teacher’s 
identity:  
.  .  . if students are indeed shutting down in the face of teaching practices 
perceived as “heavy handed” and “coercive,” we may need to develop a different 
pedagogical focus than today’s often explicit and emphatic focus on difference; 
we may need to ‘look at strategies that preclude long term antagonism’ but that 
98 
 
 
 
still allow and encourage students to engage critically with sociopolitical issues. 
(121) 
By adopting a pose more distanced from their own identities, Kopelson notes, teachers with 
visibly different identities can “increase students’ critical involvement with difficult issues by 
decreasing their preoccupation with the teacher’s identity position” (126). While it makes sense 
that less emphasis on a teacher’s identity position might increase student willingness to engage in 
discussion of issues related to that identity, Kopelson here assumes that teachers with visible 
identity positions always behave antagonistically towards students who might disagree with them 
in classroom discussions. She also assumes that a teacher who engages her identity position in 
the classroom somehow has less authority in the eyes of the students. This could be the case if 
students view identity as equivalent to bias but would not be true if students are sophisticated 
enough to differentiate between the two. 
In my writing classes, I do not have a “visibly different” identity position like the ones to 
which Kopelson refers. My long-term wellness allows me to “pass” as neurotypical. Kopelson’s 
advocacy of teaching through a “performance of “neutrality” suggests to me a valid reason for 
teachers with mental disabilities who can do so to keep our positionality as mentally disabled 
hidden. From this stance, we could engage students in a discussion of their views on mental 
disability while avoiding the possibility of resistance a personal disclosure might engender. 
When Avi said, “Sounds like he’s got bipolar mood disorder,” I froze because I did not want to 
lose my authority as a teacher. The neutral performance Kopelson suggests relies on that 
authority distracting attention away from the teacher’s position on the issue at hand. The advice 
to assume a neutral position assumes that students might not grant authority to an instructor they 
consider biased. Citing Kenneth Burke, Kopelson calls performances of neutrality in the 
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classroom useful “rhetoric on the edge of cunning” (130). She considers such cunning practical 
rather than unethical, a masquerade designed to engage students rather than a selling-out of one’s 
identity. With student engagement with the issue of stigma as the overriding goal, I am willing to 
agree that to dissemble about one’s mental disability identity, in this instance, is indeed not to 
sell out. 
 As indicated by my wording at the beginning of the original lesson plan I developed— 
regarding using disclosure to “win a small victory for [myself] and [my] mentally disabled 
compatriots”—I felt guilt for not immediately letting my students know my direct relationship to 
the source of their amusement. This sense of guilt relates to my conviction that individual mental 
disability disclosure, in any context, is an act of courage, undertaken in solidarity with, and thus 
in support of, the many people who stay hidden due to the stigma that adheres to psychiatric 
diagnoses. When the ableist incident occurred in my classroom, my instincts as an activist said 
that to remain silent when an opportunity for action arises is a sign of cowardice. While these are 
deeper issues worth exploring more closely, for my purposes in this chapter, I stick to a 
consideration of individual disability disclosure as it intersects with the needs of pedagogy. 
Having done so, I see the pedagogical potential of holding back on disclosure in the classroom 
when such “inaction” can still serve the goal of fighting stigma.  
A Pedagogical Response Reconsidered 
If a mentally disabled teacher chooses not to come out about her disability because her 
role as the person at the front of the classroom may stymie the value of that choice, how can the 
“other” speak to that teacher’s writing students when they most need to listen? Kopelson 
captures the tricky dynamics of a classroom attempting to deal with issues of difference when 
she observes: 
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What Brodkey seven years ago called ‘the endless spectacles of the terror of 
difference’ are only becoming more spectacularly terrifying, and students’ 
frequent embodiment of this terror and their resistance to its interrogation demand 
our continued and continually inventive pedagogical attentions and interventions. 
Certainly, no one knows this more or more acutely than those of us who stand 
before our students as the very subjects/objects of their terror every day. 
However, many of us who are thus positioned have also come to know that the 
representation of our true selves and /or our insurgent politics is both not enough 
and at times is counterproductive. (140) 
My students’ laughter at the thought of bipolar mood disorder certainly indicated a resistance to 
the very thought of mental difference and could easily have also hidden the kind of terror of 
difference Kopelson cites. As an alternative lesson plan, I encourage other mentally disabled 
teachers to lessen and educate that terror by bringing it face to face with people who can tell 
students about the experience of mental disability while not coming from a position of power in 
the classroom. I suggest inviting members of a Speakers Bureau, or, ideally, members of a group 
of mentally disabled students from campus, to class to interact with students. A teacher can 
locate a Speakers Bureau by contacting the local county’s Community Mental Health 
organization to see if they sponsor a set of speakers. Local mental health support groups 
composed solely of people who have mental disabilities may also have members who participate 
in advocacy through public speaking. 
 I say invited speakers should interact with rather than simply speak to students because I 
would want the Speakers Bureau members I know to assume a more participatory role than we 
do in our usual classroom presentations. In the presentations I observed, the speakers seemed in 
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many respects to function the way I often felt I was functioning, as a bug brought in for 
inspection by students who had studied the workings of that bug in their textbooks. Presenters 
take questions after their speeches, but the Q and A does not take the form of a dialogue. I only 
experienced dialogue with students during the Q and A period noted in my initial lesson plan, 
when I asked the students what they expected when they heard that mentally disabled people 
were coming to their class to speak. 
 Wanting dialogue between my students and the presenters, I suggest preparing the invited 
Speakers Bureau members to facilitate interaction. For my class, I would ask them to come in 
with the following set of questions, adapted from a list I used to generate discussion in a stigma-
fighting workshop I organized for the Bureau: 
1. How do you think the public views mental disability? To what do you attribute 
this view or these views? 
2. How do you think the public views people with mental disabilities? To what do 
you attribute this view or these views? 
3. Have you or someone you know ever experienced stigma due to mental 
disability? 
4. If you are willing, please describe that experience or those experiences. 
5. How do you want people to perceive you as a person? 
6. Do you think people with mental disabilities and those without them are the same, 
essentially? If so, why so? If not, why not?  
7. How do you relate, personally, to the term “normal” as it operates in our culture? 
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8. Are there things about mental disability or stigma that you feel you have learned 
today that you did not know before? If so, can you describe what you have 
learned? 
9. Are there things about mental disability or stigma that you feel you do not yet 
understand and would like to learn? If so, what are some of these things? 
10. What additional questions can you come up with together, to ask each other? 
 
I suggest the following set-up in the classroom: Presenters sit with small groups of students. If 
enough presenters are available, a one-to-one student to presenter ratio would be ideal. 
Presenters should take about 15 minutes to narrate their mental disability experience to their 
group of students. Afterwards, the speakers and the students can work together to respond to the 
list of questions, with both the speakers and the students making contributions to the responses 
and taking notes on them.  The instructor collects each group’s responses at the end of the class 
and distills them into a document he can share with both students and the presenters who 
attended the class. 
 I base this class design partly on Mann and Himelein’s research, which they subtitle “an 
intervention to reduce mental illness stigma in the classroom” (545). The researchers compared a 
psychology classroom intervention based on the first-person narratives of mentally disabled 
people with a more traditional approach in which students learned about mental disability 
through more distanced, third-person explanations focused on medical diagnoses. Their 
conclusion—that the introduction of first-person narratives into the classroom led to stigma 
reduction while education without the narratives did not—supports the Speakers Bureau’s use of 
narrative as a stigma fighting rhetorical method. What truly intrigued me, however, was the 
following finding: “Contact is most effective when there is ‘equal status’ between individuals 
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with mental illness and participants, as in the case of students speaking with other students or 
two persons cooperating on a task” (546). The Speakers Bureau’s “person/bug in front of the 
classroom” rhetorical stance does not create an atmosphere of equal status between the speaker 
and the listening students. By having students in our classes working in small groups with a 
speaker on the task of exploring mental illness and stigma together, as equals outside of the 
power dynamic the teacher’s involvement would impose, we might create a rhetorical situation 
in which the students and the speakers can learn from each other. By speaking and working 
together across difference, they can begin to break down the barriers caused by stigma. I suggest 
proposing the exercise to a Speakers Bureau or other group of presenters as an opportunity to 
both fight stigma and hone their rhetoric. By working together with students, they might gain a 
deeper understanding of the ways the young minds in their audiences approach both the topic 
and nature of their presentations.  
 It is important that the people who come to speak to students about mental disability are, 
indeed, people who have lived the experience of mental disability. An instructor might be 
tempted to invite a psychiatrist or psychiatric social worker into the classroom to talk about what 
these professionals would call “mental illnesses.” Doing so would be counter-intuitive to the 
effort to have students hear from “the other” rather than about her. The face that the latter would 
put on mental disability would, by definition, be the face of medical diagnosis, suggestions of 
how the mentally disabled person fits various categories of symptoms rather than the 
presentation of this kind of individual as a whole, human being. 
 I suggest introducing the exercise to students as soon as possible after a stigmatizing 
incident. With the Writing and Community class in question, I would do so in the following way: 
“Because I like you so much as a class and have been impressed with the open-minded way you 
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have approached issues of cultural difference before—such as when we have discussed 
homelessness, religious differences, single motherhood, etc.—it surprised me the other day when 
everybody seemed to crack up when it was suggested that my colleague who behaved in 
different ways at the start of each semester had bipolar mood disorder. The laughter reminded me 
how much stigma is still attached to diagnoses of mental disability. I worried about that because 
I’m sure at least some of you know people who deal with mental disability and possibly some of 
you deal with it yourselves. So, in keeping with our class focus on listening to and trying to 
understand people different from ourselves, I want to break into our syllabus and explore the 
topic of mental disability together, And I thought, ‘What better way to start talking then to bring 
in some experts, people who live the reality daily?’”  
 During the next class period, some anti-stigma advocates who are part of a local group 
called the Speakers Bureau will come in to engage you in discussion. First, they will talk about 
their experiences with mental disability, and then you will get together with them in teams to 
explore the issue further. Their goal as an organization is to lessen the stigma that exists around 
psychiatric diagnoses. I’m hoping you can assist them in that task by working together to answer 
the following questions. (At this point, I would hand out the list given to the Speakers Bureau 
members). We only have one class period, so it will just be a start, but what I hope we can do is 
raise some productive questions about mental disability and stigma.” 
 Because the lesson plan described above exists as a response to a single incident in the 
classroom, it will be especially important not to single out the student who made the troubling 
comment. I believe the best way to do this is to explain to the class that while the comment itself 
was a point of concern, it was the class reaction, the laughter, that made mental disability stigma 
something I wanted to bring to their attention. Saying this might take at least some of the 
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attention off the student who made the comment and require the class to think instead about their 
reaction to it. I also suggest presenting students with a mini-lecture about instances of mental 
disability stereotypes as they exist in popular culture. Doing so might help them see that they are 
not “guilty” of some huge wrongdoing but rather have imbibed the stigma that saturates their 
environment. Lessening potential guilt on their part for having participated in laughing at mental 
disability may lower any resistance to talking about the topic that might linger. 
 How does this alternative lesson plan address or fail to address the shame I felt when I 
froze in the classroom, shame engendered by the knowledge that I failed to immediately defend 
my compatriots in mental disability? While the decision not to disclose to a class in need of a 
stigma-fighting intervention may seem like a cowardly one, I believe a teacher’s duty to provide 
a productive experience for students, the drive to “keep students open, keep students learning, 
keep students open to learning, so they many engage with rather than shut out difference” 
supersedes my desire to manifest a basic “I am one of them, too!” kind of solidarity with fellow 
mentally disabled people (Kopelson 135). But if my lesson plan can indeed help students 
broaden their definition of “us” to include people with mental disability, it enacts a different but 
also significant kind of solidarity, a solidarity of effect.  
Within the Speakers Bureau, I can enact my identity as an advocate. Within the 
classroom, I can and will advocate for mentally disabled people, but must do so within my 
identity as a teacher. Within the classroom, I owe that identity my primary responsibility. By 
creating a lesson plan that can keep my students, and those of other mentally disabled teachers, 
open to difference in a way we might not be able to if “out” about our disabilities, I have 
attempted to address the dilemma Avi’s comment raises in a way useful to both pedagogy and 
advocacy. The lesson plan I suggest involves students and community-based anti-stigma 
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advocates working together to understand stigma in classrooms that do not have disability as a 
semester-long focus. Although brief, this plan can encourage students to engage with the topic of 
mental disability in an open way.  
By proposing a lesson plan that intervenes when ableism occurs in the classroom, a plan 
that does not include a mentally disabled instructor’s disclosure of her own disability, I make a 
claim about identity. As was implied at the beginning of this chapter, I claim that mentally 
disabled people who can pass can treat our disabilities as irrelevant in certain contexts. As long 
as we are “well,” we can hide the stigmatized aspects of our identities. But incidents like the one 
that occurred in my classroom indicate that no context is safe from the stigma that attends mental 
disability. Because this is so, I believe mentally disabled teachers who can pass have a 
responsibility to consider how we will respond to incidents of stigma in the classroom before 
they occur. I have here offered one suggestion of a way to proceed. It is quite possible that other 
instructors may choose to greet classroom ableism head on through deep disclosure even in 
classes that do not focus on disability. And they may meet with great, stigma-fighting success. 
Ultimately, what is necessary is putting students in touch with deep disclosure of some sort. 
Whether it comes from the the instructor, or, as I have argued, through encounters with mentally 
disabled members of the community, such exposure can, I hope, begin to replace the laughter 
engendered by the very thought of mental disability with respect.  
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND CONCERNS MOVING FORWARD 
 
As both a student of rhetoric and a mentally disabled person, I find myself intrigued by 
the Speakers Bureau because it regularly seeks to attain what Prendergast says mentally disabled 
people lack, “rhetoricability” or rhetorical agency (56). Like anyone else, people with publicly 
revealed psychiatric diagnoses are free to speak and write. No one will listen to us, however, 
Prendergast argues, because “normal” people see the communications of “crazy” people through 
the lens of stigma. Because they consider us irrational by definition, those who hear what we 
have to say dismiss our communications as meaningless (57). Because we bear what Goffman 
calls “spoiled identities,” members of the Speakers Bureau face rhetorical impasses when we 
enter classrooms intent on persuading young audiences to let go of negative perceptions about 
mental disability (19). Stigma paints us as incompetent people and incompetent rhetors. I joined 
the organization to understand, through participation and observation, how its members wield 
language in pursuit of the rhetorical agency necessary to get around these impasses. In what 
follows, I describe how the participants in my study approach this challenge, provide further 
analysis of the different messages sent to audiences by speakers who adhere to the two 
competing models of mental disability, and present plans for future research suggested by this 
study. 
For a basic definition of “rhetorical agency” I have relied on Campbell, who describes it 
as “the capacity to act, that is, to have the competence to speak or write in a way that will be 
recognized or heeded by others in one’s community” (3). I am drawn to Campbell’s definition by 
her choice of the word “heeded,” a verb that connotes the active, change-producing audience 
uptake of a speaker’s message. My study set out to explore the rhetorical moves Speakers Bureau 
members engage in to try to get our audiences to “heed,” i.e. to agree with our message, through 
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the haze of mental disability stigma that circulates in the culture. Based on the Bureau’s mission 
statement, this message translates to: “Ignore the stereotypes fed to you by mass media. We 
represent what it means to be mentally ill. And because we can provide living proof that people 
with mental illnesses have hope and do recover, you should not stigmatize us or discriminate 
against us.”  
The second half of Campbell’s basic definition of rhetorical agency pertains here. She 
notes that the ability to speak in a way that will be heeded “permits entry into ongoing cultural 
conversations and is the sine qua non of public participation, much less resistance as a counter-
public” (3) The Speakers Bureau strives to resist as a counter-public by circulating its texts, or 
speeches, in opposition to the dominant public “conversation” regarding what it means to be 
mentally disabled (Warner 119). Conscious of the ways in which we are stigmatized before even 
entering a classroom, Bureau speakers are careful in the way we employ our rhetoric of 
resistance. I define rhetoric here as the purposeful use of language to persuade an audience to 
think differently about a given reality. Through our personal narratives—our stories of “This is 
what it is/was like for me”—we offer audiences an alternative way to view the reality of mental 
disability, one that does not match the dominant narrative peopled with stereotypes. These 
stereotypes suggest that mentally disabled people are dangerous, incompetent, lazy, and 
disingenuous about their suffering, to name but a few public perceptions. As Gloria exclaims 
about the work of the Speakers Bureau, “This is us saying who we are!” an assertion that implies 
long experience with being described and categorized by outsiders.  
Edmund Husserl, considered the father of phenomenology, believes only normal people, 
rather than those he describes as “anormals” can be involved in the struggle to influence the 
perception of reality. As “anormal,” Husserl scholar, Dan Zahavi, gives the example of the 
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infant, the blind man, and the schizophrenic (135). As Zahavi notes, the motivation of science, 
for Husserl, is the fact that people don’t experience the world in the same way. These 
disagreements, he points out, drive the search for what Zahavi calls “irrelative knowledge” (135).  
The irony here is that the Speakers Bureau, made up of only “anormals,” would by Husserl’s 
reckoning not be allowed to do the very thing it exists to do—present its members’ sometimes 
different experiences of reality. They would be kept out of the debate Husserl believes can do 
two things: either provide a more comprehensive picture of the world by incorporating differing 
perspectives or determine a version of reality that would have validity for everyone (everyone 
rational, that is) (Zahavi 135). Through their rhetoric, the “anormal” members of the Speakers 
Bureau attempt to truly do the former in the face of societal pressures that push for the latter at 
the expense of the marginalized, “irrational” voices of mentally disabled people.  
In the classrooms where these voices choose to speak, rhetorical choices involve the 
management of risk. Even as each Speakers Bureau member enters the classroom fully prepared 
to disclose her disability and describe the unpleasant details of its manifestation in her life, two 
risk-related questions remain: To what extent should a speaker link her identity to the diagnosis 
she names for the students, and how much disclosure is too much disclosure? As my study 
indicates, individual speakers make rhetorical choices that tell the audience the extent to which 
the speaker identifies with his or her mental disability. Some attempt to distance themselves from 
the negative images attached to their diagnosis by claiming to “have” a “mental illness” rather 
than “being” a manifestation of that illness. (I say, “I have a bipolar mood disorder,” rather than 
“I am bipolar.”) And some adopt rhetorical stances, such as the pose of expert concerning mental 
disability, in a possible attempt to draw audience attention away from negative images that 
equate such disability with incompetence. (Phil begins his presentations with a list of figures 
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about the percentages of people in the country who have various mental disabilities. He also 
quizzes students, like a teacher, regarding what they know about his own disability, paranoid 
schizophrenia.) 
Speakers also make risk management decisions when it comes to decisions about levels 
of disclosure. The disclosure of too much disturbing detail about a speaker’s disability 
experiences may lead members of the student audience to increase rather than decrease their 
negative perceptions of mentally disabled people. At the same time, a speaker must provide 
enough detail to convince listeners that the person in front of them truly is disabled and thus has 
the authority to represent the reality of living with a psychiatrically diagnosed condition. All 
members of the Speakers Bureau do take the risk of offering audiences various levels of what I 
have called “deep disclosure” to provide listeners with a genuine sense of the emotions, thoughts, 
and behaviors mental disability can involve. As noted, this is part of the organization’s 
determination to present what they want audiences to see as the true “face of mental illness.”      
Although Phil mentions wanting students to “understand” psychiatric conditions, and 
Ruth notes her desire to “connect” with her audiences, none of the study participants directly 
mentions using their narrative disclosures to generate empathy. Nonetheless, I believe this goal, 
as much as the desire to disprove stereotypes, underlies the willingness of Bureau members to 
take the huge risk of deep disclosure.  We are generous with our details of the experience of 
mental disability. We “invite them in and [are] gracious” to use Gloria’s words, in an attempt to 
get audience members to come as close as possible to emotions, thoughts, and behaviors that can 
definitely seem frightening. Our disclosures indicate great trust in the ability of audience 
members to change their own perspectives about the people who share these details, thereby 
encouraging audience recognition of the humanness behind the narratives.   
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In a comment that could easily refer to the rhetorical efforts of the Speakers Bureau, blind 
poet, Emily K. Michael, describes the relationship between empathy and the fear of difference 
that can generate stigma:  
I think the difference between fear/pity and empathy is a willingness to be 
vulnerable, which may seem counter-intuitive. When someone is afraid of 
disability, and I represent that disability, they’re going to try to get away from me 
as fast as possible. If they can’t get away, they’re going to try and control the 
situation. . .Pity is another form of taking control. If a person pities me, they don’t 
have to be on my level. They can look down on my life and call this superiority 
‘compassion.’ Empathy is the willingness to go there with someone. It’s the 
willingness to say, ‘This scares the crap out of me, but I’m going to sit here and 
let you tell me what it’s really like. . .even if that reality is just as scary as I 
thought it would be.’ When someone is empathetic, they aren’t trying to talk over 
me or silence me. They’re not afraid to stand next to me and ask questions. (4). 
The deep disclosure of Speakers Bureau narratives gives our audiences an opportunity to be go 
to some difficult and disturbing places with us. The risk we take in doing this—the risk that the 
identities we put forth will be rejected—is balanced against the possibility that some listeners 
might make themselves vulnerable to changing the way they see mentally disabled people.
 In Chapter Two I ask, “what [could I] say that would reveal me as fully human, as fully 
capable goods rather than damaged ones [?]” I also mention feeling during presentations like a 
bug on display for inspection by the students. But in these instances, the bug does get a chance to 
speak for itself. The encounter is fraught both with peril, as noted by my discussion of the risks 
of disclosure, and potential. The bug’s rhetoric has much work to do in the space of just 20 
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minutes. My study reveals that Speakers Bureau members rely as much on the nature of the 
delivery of their presentations to do this work as they do on the message itself. Knowing that our 
diagnoses stigmatize us, we all strive to be the “good man speaking well” by presenting in ways 
that belie student expectations that mentally disabled people cannot speak clearly, coherently, 
and calmly. As instructed, we dress neatly, to counter any expectations of dishevelment or poor 
hygiene. As embodied rhetoric, this contrast between the speakers expected and the speakers 
who show up seems as important to the Bureau’s stereotype displacement work as the individual 
narratives. Because my study was not an empirical one, I cannot assume that such displacement 
occurs, of course. I refer here only to our rhetorical aims. 
 Although all members of my study use their personal narratives to represent “the face of 
mental illness,” they disagree as to the nature of what they are representing. Two competing 
models of mental disability are at play in the Speakers Bureau’s work: Are psychiatrically 
diagnosed conditions “illnesses,” signs of “broken brains” in need of medication? Or are such 
conditions “states of mental distress,” not medical defects but merely alternative ways of being 
human? As discussed in Chapter Two, I found that the model of mental disability a speaker 
adheres to affects the way he speaks about himself to persuade students against stigma. The 
medical model allows the speaker to verbally distance himself, his “true identity” as Hutchins 
and Kirk would call it, from what is seen as an illness like any other (262). He “has” 
schizophrenia just as he might “have” diabetes. The former should not characterize him as “bad” 
in the eyes of the audience any more than the latter would. Meanwhile, the speaker who sees her 
times of “mental distress” as part of being human refers to them as simply a part of her identity, 
something that makes her a proudly diverse individual. Both models of mental disability allow a 
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speaker to cast themselves in the kind of positive light that might challenge stigmatizing 
perceptions.  
The effect of the two competing models extends beyond wording choices to the very 
message promoted by the speakers’ presentations as well. Bureau members who derive our 
rhetoric from the medical model, the “broken brain” theory Gloria cautions against, imply 
through our reference to illness that we are, indeed, “broken.” In our presentations, we talk about 
and describe the effects of chemical imbalances. Then we stress that through medication, these 
imbalances can be corrected. In effect, we can be “fixed.” As I read it, we present the following 
argument against stigmatizing mentally disabled people: Because we can be fixed, you should 
not consider us less than you. Through medical intervention, we can function normally again, 
with the occasional set-back. Yes, when we are ill, we are different from you, but we can get 
help and change to fit into your world, into your definition of “normal.” By this we mean we can 
again be the kind of human beings you would consider “capable.” We can have jobs, maintain 
marriages, go to school, work for organizations such as the Speakers Bureau. You should accept 
us because with help, we can be mostly just like you.” This claim to having the ability to recover, 
to be mostly just like those members of the audience who are neurotypical, plays a crucial role in 
the rhetoric of all but one of the Bureau members who participated in my study. 
As the final part of my research, I produced and facilitated a collaborative, stigma-
fighting workshop with ten members of the organization. Only two workshop participants had 
taken part in my in-depth study. On the day of the event, the gathered participants responded to 
and discussed a set of questions designed to elicit their opinions about the origins and workings 
of stigma as well as information about the specific rhetorical techniques they used in their 
classroom presentations. All the participants mentioned that their narratives include details 
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designed to persuade students that the person at the front of the room is “no different than 
anybody else.” In response to the question “How do you want audiences to perceive you and 
how do you achieve this effect in your speeches?” one young man said: “I would say as a 
capable, functioning individual with hopes and dreams just like everyone else. . .at the end of my 
presentation, I talk about my current life situation. I tell them what I’m involved in, school, 
work, married life, just like anyone else, and that I hope to graduate from college with a 
Bachelor’s degree someday and maybe do public speaking as a profession.” Another participant 
said he tries through his presentations to get audiences to see “. . .that people can have hope, that 
you can work, can go to school, that you can still have strong ties with your families and friends. 
. . I just want to be seen as a regular person who is battling through something difficult but not 
immovable.” 
In contrast to the “broken but fixable” narrative, Gloria, who speaks within the context of 
the consumer/survivor/ex-patient (c/s/x) model, presents herself not as occasionally defective but 
as “diverse.” She states that she does not need to be fixed and should be accepted, with all the 
states of mental distress psychological diversity can imply. Her description of the Recovery 
movement, which falls under the c/s/x/ movement label, illustrates this alternative message about 
mental disability:  
You would never get two people telling you the same thing, but the medical 
model says you have to get fixed by medicine and the Recovery model says we all 
go through ups and downs in life and we deal with extreme distress, extreme 
sadness, happiness, alternative states of being, you know, but we get through 
these things. We sort it out for ourselves. We find out what it is to be human. This 
is what makes us humans. We’re not all the same, like little bar code labels of 
115 
 
 
 
people, you know? And that we’re detailed organisms that have hopes, fears, 
things like that. And the medical model, to me, seems to say a little bit more that 
you’re programmed to be this way. You’re programmed to be happy but not too 
happy, sad sometimes, but not too sad. But if you get a little out of sorts, then 
we’ll give you some medicine and bring you back to baseline. But everyone’s 
baseline is different, you know. 
Note how she skillfully replaces the term “normal” with “human” to broaden the set of “being 
states” she wants her audience to accept. From her positioning within the Recovery movement, 
the mentally disabled person is truly no different, essentially, from the neurotypical one. 
 The two competing models of mental illness require different levels of participation from 
rhetors and audiences involved in the stigma fighting endeavor. This occurs because the model 
one adheres to affects the relationship of the speaker to the stigma she is trying to fight. By 
representing ourselves as essentially different from our audiences, the medical model speakers 
take on the stigma that circulates in the culture. We say to audiences, in effect, “Here are our 
glaring differences. We are going to explain ourselves to you in the hope that you will empathize 
with us and also see that we can be made well, or normal, again.” Gloria does not do this. She 
rejects the stigma by arguing for a new way of perceiving mental disability altogether. She 
rejects the idea of normalcy. Speakers who stick to the rhetoric and rhetorical stances of the 
medical model take stigma, and the responsibility for mitigating its effects, primarily on 
ourselves. We attempt, through deep and (we hope) moving disclosure, to convince neurotypical 
members of our audiences to accept us into the fold. Audience members do have work to do in 
achieving this effect, as argued in Chapter Three, but mentally disabled rhetors’ self-
representation as “just like you” makes the job easier. Gloria’s position puts greater 
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responsibility for dealing with stigma on the audience. Its members are asked to expand their 
view of who should be considered fully human, rather than passing simply passing judgement, 
no matter how benign, on speakers who work to prove their worth through public speech. 
Despite the above assessment, I do not argue for one or the other model of mental 
disability as the more effective lens through which to filter rhetoric designed to fight stigma. 
During this study, I have found it very tempting to try and adjudicate between the two models, to 
suggest that speaking from one or the other might prove the better way to encourage the public to 
perceive mentally disabled people differently. Such adjudication is not possible, however, 
because convincing a mentally disabled speaker to switch models is highly unlikely, even if one 
was proven more successful at reducing stigma. My secondary research and interaction with 
study participants, as well as my own experience, suggests that a person who believes in the 
medical model will not suddenly decide to embrace a Mad identity. They will not easily be 
persuaded that what they have experienced as “symptoms”— the highs of mania, the voices 
heard in schizophrenia, the catatonia of PTSD—represents just a “different way of being human” 
rather than a medical illness. Nor do I envision a person who proudly claims an alternative kind 
of human experience easily deciding that they are “sick” after all. Also, adjudication between the 
models has little value as far as stigma fighting is concerned because whether one views one’s 
disability as a medical defect or a different way of being human, the public views it as a 
significant difference. Those who live with the impairments concurrent with mental disability 
face stigma due to that public’s fear of and distaste for this difference. 
In my time with the Speakers Bureau, I have come to respect the work they do greatly. 
Taking this work on myself, albeit not as frequently as I could have, gave me a strong sense of 
how difficult it is to, in Michael’s term, “go there” and ask audiences to follow you in the hope 
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of increasing understanding and changing minds. During the study, I in some ways learned the 
most from Gloria, the person whose views about mental disability directly challenged my own. I 
find myself wishing I could view what for me is a frustrating illness instead as a point of 
diversity and pride. I understand completely the emphasis other members of the Speakers Bureau 
put on the idea that as people, we can be “fixed.” and share the desire to be seen as “normal” by 
the rest of the world. In future research, however, I intend to examine the potential danger in the 
value that mental disability anti-stigma groups such as the Speakers Bureau put on public 
perceptions of normalcy.  
I want to explore what advocacy and activist roles can be or have been made available to 
the many mentally disabled people who cannot regularly achieve a status close to normalcy, 
people whose conditions debilitate them to the point that they would not be able to make fully 
coherent speeches to classrooms of psychology students. More to the point, I want to investigate 
the repercussions of marginalizing these voices in advocacy settings.  
I mention this because Gloria explained to me early in my research that the Speakers 
Bureau has a vetting process for potential speakers. She said that although “everyone can have an 
impact, we wouldn’t just put anyone in front of any class.” She noted that decisions about who 
should speak are tricky with mental illness. Some people, she said, would be more easily 
misunderstood based on hygiene problems or cognitive deficiencies. “In front of some 
audiences” she told me, “it’s more important to say, ‘We’re just like everyone else.’ Speakers 
who come across as more impaired or more disheveled, we’d be more cautious about where to 
put them, so as not to reinforce stereotypes. . . Mental illness stereotypes are big, and powerful, 
and strong, for example the disheveled schizophrenic with a cap and a big coat.” At the time 
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Gloria told me this, I let it slide because I was focused on the rhetorical work of my already 
determined set of study participants. But the vetting issue did stick in my craw.  
As my research continued, I wondered how complete a picture of the reality of mental 
disability our group of speakers was offering to students. The disheveled and more highly 
impaired people—the ones not represented by our small group of presentably dressed, well-
spoken Bureau members, whom Goffman would call “heroes of adjustment,”—are the very 
people who often face the highest levels of stigma and therefore discrimination and poverty in 
the community (25). How might the exclusion of these voices affect our group’s capacity to 
really fight stigma at its roots? The situation reminds me of the boy in high school who made 
racist jokes about African-American people while sitting right next to me (Indian-American) and 
my Filipino-American friend, Tricia. I once asked him how he could do that, given that Tricia 
and I were people of color, too. His response? “Oh, you guys are ok ‘cause you’re doctors and 
lawyers, and things.”  
After completing this first portion of my research, questions that I want to pursue in 
future research remain: When “putting a face on mental illness,” what face should we be turning 
to? What harm might we be doing by excluding the most troubled faces? To what extent have we 
truly addressed the stigma surrounding mental illness if the people representing their experiences 
with mental illness are, in terms of the capacity to represent themselves through speech, “doctors 
and lawyers and things”? Will our words help remove stigma from people like ourselves, those 
who have sane privilege and can “pass,” while doing little to alleviate the stigma experienced by 
people who more closely match the cultural stereotypes of what it means to be mentally ill?  
As they will not get chosen to join the Speakers Bureau, at least to speak to audiences of 
high school and college students, where will more severely disabled people have their chance to 
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speak and share their experience with general audiences who might indeed respond by letting go 
of the stigma that separates the two groups? While I do understand the hesitancy to put such 
speakers in front of the public, thereby risking the reinforcement of stereotypes, my initial 
experience with the Bureau suggests to me that such occasions must occur. If only the people 
whose bearing and rhetorical techniques suggest a “good” character or ethos get the chance to 
represent “the mentally ill”—which is what the individual members of the Speakers Bureau are 
doing—to what extent are we truly fighting the most intransigent stigma? Johnson argues that 
audiences should make accommodations for “the bad man speaking poorly” (476). I want to 
investigate the stigma-fighting potential of this proposal.  
In relation to this question of who, my research raised a concern with the content of the 
Speakers Bureau presentations I studied, a question of what. The rhetoric of most of my study 
participants, my own included, might be seen by some, albeit quite disparagingly, as a “song and 
dance” in which the speaker tells the audience, “See, I was crazy, but I’ve taken medication, and 
I’m better now. So, you don’t have to worry about me, and you don’t have to address any of the 
larger issues of oppression, discrimination, and potential human rights violations that come with 
mental disability. You don’t have to worry about all those people you see talking to themselves, 
or sleeping on benches, or locked up in solitary confinement. Everything is all right. We 
represent mental disability, mental disability contained in this relatively nice, relatively safe 
picture.”  
As all but one of my participants speak from within the medical model and recovery, I do 
wonder what political issues pertinent to mental disability remain obscured by this rhetorical 
choice. For example, Lewiecki-Wilson, suggests that even when people with mental disabilities 
are allowed to participate in the public sphere as equal humans, they can find themselves “being 
120 
 
 
 
pushed toward the argument, ‘we just want to be treated like everyone else’ thereby diluting the 
transformative potential of their participation in the public forum” (159).  Lewiecki-Wilson’s 
contention makes me wonder about the demands of people with mental disabilities that extend 
beyond the potentially limited request to be publicly perceived as normal. As my research 
continues, I hope to explore what key issues might be kept from the public eye by what activist 
and Mad scholar, V. Armstrong, refers to as “sanitized” anti-stigma campaigns and Brigit 
McWade et. al. call “individualized and neatly packaged tales of recovery that are sometimes 
promoted at the expense of stories of oppression, marginalization, and collective activism” 
(McWade et. al. 307-08).  
In noting these research interests, I do not intend in any way to denigrate the work of the 
Speakers Bureau, a group I respect for its members’ courageous, generous, and unflagging 
commitment to promoting public understanding of mental disability by making their stories 
public. I know that no one group can do everything there is to do in the large-scale effort needed 
to address the stigma faced by people with mental disabilities. Rather, it is my exposure to the 
Speakers Bureau’s powerful work that has inspired me to ask questions about how the fight 
against stigma can take place on an even wider playing field than the one to which its members 
generously granted me access. 
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APPENDIX A (Individual Interview Questions) 
Individual Participant Interview (90 minutes) 
 
1. Tell me about a time you were speaking with the Speakers Bureau that really stands out 
for you in some way. 
2. How do you feel when you are up in front of a classroom talking about your experiences 
with mental illness? 
3. How do you decide what aspects of your experience to include in your presentations and 
what to leave out? 
4. How do you judge how students are responding to your presentations? 
5. Why did you join the Speakers Bureau?  
6. What is your current mental health diagnosis? 
7. In what ways has that diagnosis manifested itself in your life? 
8. Do you have periods when you are completely well? 
9. How have other people (outside your Speakers Bureau activities) responded to your 
illness? 
10. Tell me about a moment when you disclosed to somebody that wasn’t during a Speakers 
Bureau event. 
11. Has presenting at Speakers Bureau events changed how you speak about yourself? 
12. What are the other scenes in which you speak about your illness? 
13. Can you think of a time or times when others reacted to you talking about your illness in 
surprising or noteworthy ways? 
14. How is talking about your illness at Speakers Bureau events different from other scenes 
where you speak about it? 
15. Think 15 years down the road. What would you like the Speakers Bureau to have 
achieved? 
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APPENDIX B (Speakers Bureau Collaborative Workshop Questions) 
Questionnaire for the Speakers Bureau Stigma Fighting Workshop 
Directions: Please answer the following questions on a separate sheet of paper, numbering each 
question as you go. Do not put your name on your answer sheet. Please use as much room as you 
need to answer each question to your satisfaction. There are no right or wrong answers, of 
course, just the hope that you will be inspired to provide the insights you have about stigma! 
Thank you in advance, and see you at the workshop  
 
1. How do you think the general public views mental illness? 
a. To what do you attribute this view or these views? 
2. How do you think the general public views mentally ill people? 
a. To what do you attribute this view or these views? 
3. Have you experienced stigma due to your mental illness? 
a. If you are willing, please describe that experience or those experiences. 
4. Do you see your speeches as an attempt to combat stigma? 
a. If so, what particular aspects of what you say and/or how you say it do you use to 
try and achieve this effect? 
5. How do you want audiences to perceive you as a person? 
a. What do you do in your speeches to try and achieve this effect? 
6. Making the assumption that many of the people in the audience do not have mental 
illnesses:  Do you want them to consider you the same as them, essentially? 
a. If so, why so? 
b. If not, why not?  
7. How do you relate, personally, to the term “normal” as it operates in our culture? 
8. Are there things about how to fight stigma that you feel you have learned through your 
participation with the Speakers Bureau, things you did not know before you joined? 
a. If so, can you describe what you have learned? 
9. Are there things about how to fight stigma that you feel you do not yet understand and 
would like to learn? 
a. If so, what are some of these things? 
10. Additional thoughts? 
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People with mental disabilities, or what are sometimes referred to as “mental illnesses,” 
face stigma when they interact with the public. To fight this stigma, the members of a small, 
grassroots, advocacy organization known as the Speakers Bureau travel to high school and 
college classrooms narrating their experiences with mental disability. They do so to replace 
culturally circulating stereotypes regarding such disability with more accurate and positive 
images. This dissertation is an auto-ethnographic exploration of the rhetoric of the Speakers 
Bureau. Through rhetorical analysis of members’ classroom speeches, interviews with each 
speaker, and the speaker’s self- assessment of their own rhetorical motivations, it identifies the 
moves one group of mentally disabled speakers makes to circumvent the impasses that stigma 
puts in their way of their efforts to persuade audiences to let go of negative perceptions of people 
who bear psychiatric diagnoses.  The study of the Speaker’s Bureau’s rhetoric involved six 
participants including the author. It led to the following conclusions: First, the way in which a 
mentally disabled speaker represents her identity to audiences depends on which model of 
mental disability she accepts—the “medical model,” which posits mental disability as an illness 
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that medication can successfully address, or the “consumer/survivor/ex-patient” model, which 
considers mental disability not a defect but simply an alternative way of being human. Second, 
the speakers’ attempts to persuade rely on “deep disclosure” of the disturbing nature of their 
experiences with mental disability. Deep disclosure makes the speakers vulnerable to rejection 
by the audience, but may also open the possibility for a reciprocal vulnerability in members of 
the audience, vulnerability to the idea that mental disability can affect them and vulnerability to a 
change in the audience member’s faith in the idea of normalcy. Through these vulnerabilities, the 
speaker and the audience member grant each other agency. The speaker grants the audience the 
agency to accept or reject him, and the audience member grants the speaker the agency to truly 
change the audience member’s perception of mentally disabled people. Through these mutual 
acknowledgments of agency, the agentive potential of each speech comes into being. 
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